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INTRODUCTION
The successors of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperors hated Spain; so say
many authors. The theme runs like a leit-motif in Paula Fichtner’s recent
biography of the emperor Maximilian II. She insists that he “would never like
Spain or Spaniards”, and that he “was generally contemptuous of his Spanish
relatives (except his wife) and their subjects, either openly or indirectly”. This
was unfortunate, since he “had no alternative to living in close proximity with
Spaniards whom he disliked intensely” 2. It has often been assumed that in this,
as in so much else, his son Rudolf II followed in his footsteps. Chudoba stated
that Rudolf “inherited” his father’s hostility to the superiority displayed by
king of Spain 3. Evans went further: he argued that from the reign of Charles V
onwards, the two branches of the Habsburg dynasty were locked in permanent
conflict which “is sometimes latent, never resolved, even in periods of apparent
co-operation”. He summarises Rudolf II’s attitude to Spaniards in a terse
phrase: “he really hated them” 4. 
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1       F. SCHILLER: Don Carlos, trans. H. Collier Sy-Quia, Oxford 1996, Act 5, Sc. IX, p.
192.
2       P. SUTTER FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, Newhaven-London 2001, pp. 22, 31
and 118 respectively.
3       B. CHUDOBA: España y el Imperio, Madrid 1963, p. 259.
4       R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world. A study in intellectual history, 1576-1612,
Oxford 1973, pp. 12-13 and p. 53 respectively.
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It was a truism in sixteenth-century Europe that Spaniards and Germans
hated each other, particularly after the 1540s. Protestant propaganda sought to
denigrate Charles V by attaching this foreign label to him, however ill-fitting. His
attempts to reinforce Catholicism were regarded as part of a “Spanish” world
view, particularly after the key role played by the duke of Alba and Spanish
soldiers during the Schmalkaldic wars in 1546-1547, which led to extensive
vilification of all things Spanish. When, in the context of another war, the duke
of Alba ordered the execution of the Flemish nobles Egmont and Horn in 1567,
the Venetian ambassador commented that it would cause “perpetual and indelible
hatred between the German and Spanish nations”. But the situation was
complex. Spaniards were as likely to be damned in such propaganda for being too
Catholic as for being too Jewish or even Muslim 5. Moreover, in more recent
works it is the Emperor Ferdinand I, born and bred in Spain, and who continued
to present himself as “Infans et Princeps Hispaniarum”, who has been widely
credited with establishing the basis of the “via media” between the warring
Christian creeds which is presented as the opposite of “Spanish” religious
tendencies 6. Moreover, it was the apparently Spanish-hating Maximilian II who,
while happily married to a Spanish Infanta, governed the Spanish realms
successfully, and allowed his heir, Rudolf, and three other sons to live a large part
of their lives in Philip II’s court in Spain. He also did everything in his power to
marry his eldest daughter, Anna, to the Spanish monarch 7. 
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5       P. W. POWELL: Tree of Hate, New York & London, 1971, ch. 3, esp. pp. 47-50; S.
ARNOLDSSON: La Leyenda Negra. Estudios sobre sus orígenes, Götenborg 1970, part IV: “La
Leyenda Negra en Alemania”. G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe, 3
vols., Vienna 1892-1895, III, p. 441 note 2: “il sigillo di un odio indelebile et perpetuo tra la
nation alemana et spagnola”.
6       A good starting point for Ferdinand I: A. KOHLER: Ferdinand I. 1503-1564. Fürst,
König und Kaiser, Munich 2003, and P. S. FICHTNER: Ferdinand I of Austria, Boulder
(Colorado) 1982. The useful collection by A. ALVAR (ed.): Socialización, vida privada y
actividad pública de un Emperador del Renacimiento. Fernando I, 1503-1564, Madrid 2004,
includes P. SCHMIDT’S: “‘Infans sum Hispaniarum’. La difícil germanización de Fernando I”,
pp. 273-284. See also C. LAFERL: Die Kultur der spanier in Österreich unter Ferdinand I. (1522-
1564), Vienna 1997.
7       Good starting points for Maximilian: P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, New
Haven & London 2001, and V. BIBL’s works, especially his: Maximilian II.: Der rässelhafte
Kaiser, Hellerau bei Dresden, s. d., and the collection by F. EDELMAYER & A. KOHLER
(eds.): Kaiser Maximilian II. Kultur und Politik im 16. Jahrhundert, Munich 1992.
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It is notable that proof of the existence of this hatred for Spain is seldom
provided. The most frequently used primary sources are the letters of Venetian
or papal envoys whose states were frequently at odds with Philip II, making
them receptive to critical comments. These have tended to be misconstrued by
later historians who expect national tensions to be the norm. The 1574 report
of the Venetian ambassador Cortaro is a case in point. It has been cited to prove
Maximilian II’s hatred of Spain. Cortaro claimed that he had a low opinion of
Philip II’s ministers, indeed 
such great disdain that the thing he most likes to do is to speak ill of them all ...
he has spoken to me several times at great length on this, calling them ‘the Little
Spaniards’, and almost inferring that they are solely concerned with their own
interests 8. 
On an earlier occasion Maximilian had spoken angrily of a “certo Spagnoletto”
who had misrepresented his motives for approving the peace between Catholics
and Protestants in France 9. As criticism of venal ministers go this is mild
indeed, and using the diminutive when alluding to “Spanish” ministers seems
more disdainful than anything else. None of this, of course, is a condemnation
of Philip II or of all things Spanish. In any case, as I have argued elsewhere, the
term “Spanish” was not always a “national” designation at this point. One of
the king’s leading ministers until 1573 was Portuguese; the influential cardinal
Granvelle was from the Franche Comté, and Italians not only advised the king
but filled key government posts. Yet all could be called in certain contexts
“Spanish”, as would the numerous Netherlanders and Germans in the top
ranks of the military who made up the “Spanish” army 10. Critical, even acerbic
comments against “Spanish” policies, particularly in relation to the use of
military force to enforce orthodoxy, and complaints of Spanish pride appear to
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8       Cit. R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 53 note 1: 
“di tanto sdegno, che niuna cosa fa più volontieri, che dir mal di tuti loro ... et con me n’ha
tenuto diverse volte lunghissime ragionamenti, chiamandoli Spagnoleti quasi volesse
inferire, che solo mirino il propio commodo”.
9       G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen..., op. cit., III, p. 439 note 3 citing events
from 22 and 23 March 1568.
10     M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: “Patriotismo y política exterior en la España de Carlos
V y Felipe II”, in F. RUIZ MARTÍN (ed.): La Proyección Europea de la Monarquía Hispánica,
Madrid 1996, pp. 49-105, esp. pp. 74-76, 90-100.
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have been commonplace at the imperial court 11, but we should not confuse this
with general hostility. 
Rudolf II spent over seven years living with Philip II, treated much like the
king’s son. In later life he spoke Spanish by preference and dressed in Spanish
fashion. It is paradoxical, therefore, that he should also be portrayed as someone
who hated Spain. Unsurprisingly, most historians paint a complex, even
contradictory picture as can be seen from this selective sample: Chudoba paints
a fairly positive picture. Having stated that Rudolf II was hostile to “Spanish
policies”, he argued that Rudolf had imbibed Spanish culture and “the strict
spirit” of the Spanish court, as well as the ideas which governed the life and
work of Philip II. In later life, however, mental illness caused the emperor to lose
the many benefits he had gained from “his Spanish education” 12. Evans
identified the diverse influences that Rudolf II was exposed to under his father
and his uncle and concluded that he veered between two extremes with regards
to Spain: “part unthinking acceptance, part violent antipathy” 13. Haupt echoes
the widespread view that Rudolf II was attached to Spanish culture but did not
like the Spanish or their politics. In keeping with a negative view of Spain, he
associated certain negative aspects of the emperor’s character –his haughty
demeanour, his reserve, and his limited capacity to laugh– with the Spanish
Habsburgs 14. Contemporaries were similarly struck by the combination of
admiration and rejection, but it is worth noting that Philip II’s ambassador at the
imperial court commented shortly after Rudolf II took power that Maximilian II
had been more partial to “los españoles” than his son 15. 
His refusal to marry Philip II’s daughter, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia,
appears to prove Rudolf II’s antipathy towards Spain. The rejection of his
favourite child by a man he had treated like a son, and on whom he had lavished
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11     H. LOUTHAN: The quest for compromise. Peacemakers in counter-reformantion Vienna,
Cambridge 1997, pp. 134-136.
12     B. CHUDOBA: España y el Imperio, op. cit., p. 244, p. 258.
13     R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., pp. 12-13.
14     H. HAUPT: “Kaiser Rudolf II. in Prag: Persönlichkeit und imperialer Anspruch”, in
Prag um 1600, Vienna 1988, 2 vols., I, pp. 45-55, this at pp. 46-47.
15     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario de..., embajador imperial en la corte de Felipe II, ed. de F.
Labrador Arroyo, Madrid 2001, p. 162: “El emperador en la demostración y afición a los
españoles no correspondía a su padre ya difunto”.
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affection and material support, was a hard blow for Philip II personally as well
as politically. It is not difficult to imagine him commenting, as did his fictional
counterpart in Schiller’s play Don Carlos, that while he could accept Europe
cursing him, from Rudolf II he deserved gratitude 16. An article alone cannot
give a full account of the long and tortuous marriage negotiations. A more
detailed analysis of ambassadors’ dispatches will be covered in another
publication. This preliminary study focuses on key structural elements that
both united and divided the two branches of the Habsburg dynasty, and
contends that Rudolf ’s actions can be explained in large measure by reference
to longstanding conflicts over imperial authority and political supremacy.
BACKGROUND
Charles V and Ferdinand I had cooperated so closely that it is usual to
present them as part of the same entity. Both Kohler and Edelmayer make a
distinction between the “gesamtsystem” they operated and the “teilsystem”
established after Philip II and Maximilian II took over. The very terms imply
that unity gave way to disunity 17. Yet, it could be argued that there were more
similarities than differences. Ferdinand I was certainly more dependent on his
brother than would be the case with their successors, at least in the beginning,
but many of the elements that both bound and divided the family spanned the
century. 
The redrawing of geographical and political boundaries, invariably a source of
instability, was one common element. Grave problems were caused at the outset
as a result of the unnatural decoupling of the imperial title, the greatest in
Christendom, from the Habsburg territories in Central and Eastern Europe
between 1519 and 1558. Charles V insisted on taking the title, but he allocated the
Austrian lands to Ferdinand in the forcible partition of his multiple inheritance.
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16     In the play, the words are addressed to the fictional Marquis de Posa.
17     A. KOHLER: “Vom Habsburgishen Gesamtsystem Karls V. zu den Teilsystemen
Philippps II. und Maximilians II.”, in F. EDELMAYER & A. KOHLER (eds.): Kaiser
Maximilian II..., op. cit., pp. 13-37; F. EDELMAYER: “Los hermanos, las alianzas dinásticas y
la sucesión imperial”, in A. ALVAR (ed.): Socialización, vida privada y actividad pública de un
Emperador..., op. cit., pp. 167-179, “el antiguo sistema global y colectivo... se rompió... en dos
sistemas parciales”, p. 175 and p. 179.
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As Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V was the secular leader of the Christian
world, but he did not consider the war in Hungary, where Ferdinand and
Suleyman fought for control, to be part of his remit; nor the defence of Austria,
although he did march to its aid in 1532, when he hoped to fight Suleyman in
person. Without imperial authority and resources, Ferdinand I was not in a
position to defend his lands adequately, let alone drive the Ottomans back.
Ferdinand I believed that he had been left to shoulder the responsibility of
defending Christendom against the Turks but had been deprived of the means to
do so. By dint of constant pressure and reminders that God had given Charles V
imperial authority to deal with the Turks, he secured almost all the contributions
of the imperial Diet to defend the region. Charles V resented this diversion of
funds and came to believe that his brother was exploiting him and the German
lands to fund his expansion into Bohemia and Hungary 18. 
By 1550 he also suspected that Ferdinand I was attempting to usurp imperial
authority, and declared that he was going “to establish whether he is emperor or
I am”. The matter is worth rehearsing here as it has some relevance to the later
conflicts. Since Charles V could not reside in the Holy Roman Empire,
Ferdinand I had acted as his deputy in his frequent absences. To buttress his
authority and reward him, Charles V arranged for Ferdinand to be elected King
of the Romans in 1531, that is, to gain the title normally given to the emperor-
elect. Thereafter, Ferdinand I expected to succeed to the imperial title. He
sought to increase his power by acquiring states in German lands and North
Italy which were part of the Holy Roman Empire. Charles V impeded this and
after 1548 significantly undermined the authority and territorial integrity of the
empire in favour of his son and successor, Philip II. He transferred Milan and
Sienna, and reconstituted the Low Countries into a more unified polity all but
freed from imperial authority. Until 1548 the Low Countries had been
designated as the dowry of his eldest daughter, the Infanta Maria. But when she
married Archduke Maximilian that year, Charles V rescinded the promise and
assigned them to Philip II as well. Maximilian had cause for resentment, both
on a personal level, and as potential future emperor. But worse was to come.
Charles V also attempted to secure the succession to the title of Holy Roman
Emperor for Philip II. Ferdinand and Maximilian fought effectively against this,
helped by the hostility the measure provoked in the Holy Roman Empire.
340
María José Rodríguez Salgado
18     M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: “Charles V and the dynasty”, in H. SOLY (ed.): Charles
V. 1500-1558, Antwerp 1999, pp. 27-111, this at p. 106.
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Although Ferdinand I signed a family pact in March 1551 in which the imperial
title would alternate between the two branches of the family, after the rebellion
of 1552 Philip II realised the folly of putting himself forward as a candidate, and
did his utmost to help Ferdinand I obtain the imperial title. Both sides had
witnessed how dangerous the division of the dynasty had been 19. 
Despite the good will on both sides after 1558, the Low Countries, North
Italy and the imperial title would repeatedly provoke conflicts between them.
Increasingly, they were also divided by religious issues. The gulf was evident by
the 1550s when Charles V and Ferdinand I espoused contrary solutions for the
conflict between Catholic and Protestant in the Holy Roman Empire. It is
generally assumed that these tensions increased under Philip II because he has
a reputation as an uncompromising and inflexible Catholic. This is not the case.
Christendom was more deeply divided as early attempts to unify Christendom
failed and fundamentalists came to the fore. Philip II had to balance his desire
to preserve the Catholic Church with an equally powerful determination to
preserve his empire. In this, he was no different from Ferdinand I or Rudolf II.
Religious affairs were not detached from issues of authority and security.
Matters of faith habitually fused with questions of honour. One example
suffices to illustrate the complexity and the nuanced way in which both sides
negotiated this contested space. Ferdinand I asked the papacy to make
concessions to the Protestants over the marriage of priests and communion.
Philip II thought this was dangerous and would compromise Catholicism. He
tried to convince his uncle with reasoned arguments. Having failed, he put
pressure on the pope to reject the request. Ferdinand I responded by insisting
that Philip II show respect for “his position and imperial authority” 20. Philip
II argued that he was compelled to act thus because of his religious and moral
principles. It was not his intention to challenge or undermine the emperor’s
power but to defend the faith. For good measure he added that he had acted on
the advice of “the wisest” of his advisers. He emphasised that he: 
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19     M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: “Charles V and the dynasty”, op. cit., pp. 106-109; M.
J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: The Changing Face of Empire, Cambridge 1988, pp. 33-40, 103-
104; “Fragmentación y ocaso del imperio Carolino”, in B. GARCÍA GARCÍA (ed.): El imperio
de Carlos V: procesos de agregación y conflictos, Madrid 2000, pp. 47-79. F. EDELMAYER: “Los
hermanos, las alianzas dinásticas...”, op. cit., pp. 173-175.
20     AGS, Estado, 651, fol. 49, Count of Luna to Philip II, 21 May 1562. I am grateful
to Ignasi Fernández Terricabras for reminding me of this letter.
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would truly have preferred not to intervene in this, because, apart from our
kinship and the natural bonds between us, there is such true love and complete
convergence of our will, that I earnestly wish to act in conformity with you
everywhere and in all things 21. 
According to Fichtner, religion proved the most divisive factor during the
reign of Maximilian II 22. The point is emphasised by Louthan, who paints a
picture of irreconcilable conflict between the irenicism and a via media
espoused by Maximilian and “the burning catholic zeal of the Spanish king” 23.
There was certainly a great deal of discussion and profound concern over
Maximilian II’s religious proclivities, but in this Philip II did no more or less
than Ferdinand I, successive popes and the empress Maria, to keep Maximilian
in the established faith. The two monarchs clashed frequently on the
fundamental issue whether concessions were a better solution to the growing
unrest in Christendom than the forcible imposition of orthodoxy, both putting
pressure on the other. As the years passed, it was evident that neither policy had
succeeded. Philip II was aware that some of Maximilian’s concessions to the
Protestants, including the controversial policy he applied in Austria during
1568-1569, were more a question of authority than religious belief and acted
accordingly 24. The policy of compromise adopted by the imperial branch
paradoxically strengthened Philip II’s authority. The emperor was, by tradition
and expectation, the secular head of Christendom, and was expected to defend
the established church both from heresy and infidels. As the Austrian branch
signed pacts with Protestants and humiliating capitulations with the Turks,
Philip II’s aggressive policies on both counts earned plaudits. His power was
greater; his aims more in tune with old traditions, consequently he was presented
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21     HHStA, Spanien Hofkorrespondenz 1, fasz.1, mappe 6, fols. 45-46, Philip II to
Ferdinand, 23 March 1564: 
“siendo yo mouido con fundame[n]to tan forçoso, como es el de la consçiençia y el de la
religion”; “quisiera mucho escusar de interponerme enello, desseando como yo tanto desseo
que assi como demas de los vinculos y razones naturales ay entre nos tan verdadero amor,
y tanta conformidad de voluntad, assi en todas partes y lugares y ent todas cosas huuiesse
esta correspondençia”... “aunque el paresçer sea diuerso, la voluntad y fin es vno”.
22     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., pp. 113-116.
23     H. LOUTHAN: The quest for compromise..., op. cit., pp. 49-133, quote at p. 152.
24     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., chp. X, “Christians divided”, and
in particular, pp. 153-154.
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–and saw himself– as the leading prince in Christendom. Moreover, as the
legitimate heir of Charles V he could rightly claim to be the head of the House
of Habsburg. This lies at the heart of the complaints against “Spanish pride” in
the imperial court. The two sides were engaged in a longstanding dispute about
status and supremacy.
The imperial title was the only element that allowed the Austrian branch to
claim superiority. When Philip II withdrew as a candidate he hoped in
exchange to get a share of imperial power: the coadjuntorship of the north
Italian fiefs. This would have allowed him to exercise imperial authority in that
region, greatly facilitating the defence of Milan and reinforcing his power over
the north Italian states. Ferdinand I refused his request, arguing that such a
major reduction in the power of the emperor would be disastrous. Significantly,
Philip II backed down, putting his alliance with the imperial family first 25. This
left him as a imperial feudatory in Milan and Sienna – and, the imperialists
argued, in much of the Low Countries. The problem was that the emperor no
longer had the military and political power to police the region and guarantee
the security of Philip II’s lands. The outbreak of rebellion in the strategically-
positioned imperial fief of Finale in July 1558 brought this issue to the fore and
almost destroyed the family alliance. As duke of Milan and protector of the
Republic of Genoa, Philip II would not tolerate instability in the region that
might lead to French incursions. As emperor, Ferdinand I had the legal
authority to intervene and insisted on his right to impose an agreement between
the rebels and their lord. He failed to settle the matter and was forced to call
upon Philip II to intervene militarily and prevent neighbouring states from
annexing the area. Yet he would not allow him to annex Finale 26. 
Not long after Maximilian II became emperor, a second rebellion broke out
and the situation was repeated. Losing patience, in 1571 Philip II’s governor
in Milan invaded the principality. Maximilian II was outraged and demanded
its immediate restitution 27. The issue for him was stark: Philip II had
“undermine[d] my jurisdiction and reputation”. For two years the two monarchs
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25     M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: The Changing Face of Empire, op. cit., pp. 165-167.
26     F. EDELMAYER: Maximilian II., Philipp II. und Reichsitalien, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 7-13. 
27     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., emphasises the force of Maximilian’s reaction,
p. 88: “sintiéndolo mucho el emperador”, p. 89: “auiéndolo tomado tan a pechos el césar”. He
refers to it as “negocio tan graue”; “negocio... de tanto peso”.
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argued over “this dark matter” as Philip II called it, with Maria mediating 28.
Angry as they were, neither man lost sight of the fact that they must not allow
such differences “to break their friendship”. Arguing that his authority would be
entirely compromised in Germany as well as Italy if Philip II did not recognise
his superior, imperial authority, Maximilian quoted back to Philip II the words
the king often addressed to him: “our affairs must be as one”. He promised both
to serve Philip II and to be “as good a brother as is required for the good of our
House” 29. Philip II capitulated, and withdrew his troops from Finale. 
Despite this victory, Fichtner argues that the conflict “reduced
Maximilian’s stature among German princes” 30. While acknowledging the
emperor’s military weakness and his inability to impose his legal and political
policy, Edelmayer claims that Maximilian’s actions saved the authority of the
Holy Roman Empire in North Italy. This too is arguable, since it had survived
the loss of Milan and Sienna. But Edelmayer is surely right to argue that the
Finale crisis was the highpoint of Habsburg family conflict over North Italy,
and that the imperial family won. Philip II never again attempted a military
solution in the region 31. 
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28     AGS, Estado, 1232, fol. 151, Maximilian to Philip, 22 May 1571, cit F. EDELMAYER:
Maximilian II., Philipp II. und Reichsitalien, op. cit., p. 83 note 135: “suplico a Vestra Alteza
no permitto que el ni naidie trate cosa en perjuicio de my jurisdicion y reputacion” (sic.).
Edelmayer offers a detailed account of the conflict, pp. 13 ff. María emphasised that
Maximilian was trying to save his reputation and he had a point – J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ &
M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María de Austria, Madrid 2004, n. 44,
p. 239: “questa negra rreputaçion nos haze salir de seso, y aun a las vezes del mundo” .... “vos ve
que [no] deja el Emperador de tener rrazón”; n. 45 p. 240, to Philip II, 13 February 1572 and
again on 31 July 1571, where she refers to “negro negoçio de Final, como vos le lla[ma] con
mucha rrazón”, stressing: “conçertar será el mejor remedio”, n. 34 p. 219. 
29     CODOIN, 112 vols., Madrid 1842-1896, CIII, pp. 21-22, Maximilian II to Philip II, 25
January 1575: “el negocio del Final..., como es cosa de mucha importancia, y tal que no solamente
en Italia, mas toda Alemania echa el ojo” (p. 21); “pues, como dice, nuestras cosas han de ser todas
unas, y yo deseo servirle, y le he de ser tan buen hermano como conviene al bien de nuestra casa”
(p. 22). H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 90: “le mandó que hiziese nueuas instancias
procurando que no huuiesse rompimiento en la amistad que auía entre estos dos príncipes”.
30     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., p. 175. The matter is dealt with
briefly in pp. 174-175.
31     F. EDELMAYER: Maximilian II., Philipp II. und Reichsitalien, op. cit., II, pp. 211-
215. “Hätte er das nicht getan, wäre das gleichbedeutend gewesen mit dem Ende der kaiserlichen 
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When rebellion tore Genoa apart, Maximilian II stepped in at once and
insisted that as Emperor he had sole authority to act as judge between the
contending parties. But he acknowledged that it was imperative for him to
avoid an open clash with Philip II who was their protector, not least because
this would open the door to interference from the pope and France 32.
Somewhat disingenuously he claimed that he had not intervened to establish his
“superiority” but to impose peace. Philip II chose to avoid conflict, intervening
covertly. But once peace was restored he insisted that the emperor should
continue to use the Spanish embassy in Genoa rather than to have separate
diplomatic representation 33. Not all interactions in the region led to conflict.
The two branches were quick to cooperate when their interests converged as in
the case of containing the ambitions of Florence 34. 
A similar pattern of cooperation and conflict characterises relations over the
Low Countries. In order to demonstrate their subjection to imperial authority,
Maximilian II attempted repeatedly to intervene in the region. There was a
practical reason as well: to enforce the right to collect taxation from imperial
fiefs for defence. Philip II managed to protect his lands from this financial
burden and he would recognise no superior when it came to devising a suitable
policy to quell the rebellion that broke out after 1566. He opted for a military
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Lehenshoheit in Italien” (p. 214). L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II, Rey de
España, ed. J. Martínez Millán & C. J. de Carlos Morales, Salamanca 1998, 4 vols., III, pp.
1644-1647 summary of the conflict.
32     CODOIN, CXIII, pp. 332-324, Monteagudo to Philip II, 16 February 1575.
33     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 102-113; G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische
Depeschen..., op. cit., III, n. 215 p. 579, Vicenzo Tron to the Doge, 9 December 1575 reports
Maximilian’s comments: 
“soggionse: ‘Li Spagnuoli vennero in gelosia di me, quando mandai li miei ambasciatori in
quella città. Ma io mi sono lassato intender à loro et à tutti di haverli mandati, non per
pretensione ch’io habbia di superiorità in quella città, ma per satisfar à quello ch’io sono
tenuto: che è di procurar la pace sempre et la commune quiete d’Italia et della christianità’”. 
Philip’s instructions to Monteagudo on the ambassador, CODOIN, CXIII, p. 403, 30 June
1576.
34     G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen..., op. cit., III, n. 198 pp. 502-504, Giovanni
Micheli to the Doge, 19 October 1570; also, n. 197 pp. 497-499; n. 210 pp. 557-559, Vicenzo
Tron to the Doge, 7 February 1575; CODOIN, CXIII, pp. 334-335, Monteagudo to Philip II,
16 February 1575.
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solution, which Maximilian II vehemently opposed, largely for ideological
reasons. But just as the imperial family suspected Philip II and his successors
of coveting the imperial title, so did the Spanish branch believe that they
continued to covet the Low Countries. It took years of failure and a financial
collapse to make Philip II appreciate the value of attempting a compromise
solution. In 1575 he intimated that he would like Maximilian II to mediate a
settlement. The emperor was happy to oblige, but wanted to maximise the gain
in reputation by making Philip II request his help publicly, and he demanded
freedom to determine the conditions – as if he were indeed their sovereign.
Besides the loss of honour of a public request for aid, Philip II did not trust him
sufficiently to give him a free hand. The intransigence of the Spaniards became
a habitual complain in the imperial court, but eventually Maximilian II
appreciated that both sides were equally intransigent and, as in the case of his
own lands, towards the end of his life he refused to take sides, despairing over
the violent world around him 35. 
Notwithstanding these political, territorial and religious divisions, the
Habsburg alliance held. Their willingness to compromise was prompted partly
by their affection for each other and for the dynasty. They had all lived together
at some stage of their lives, reinforcing personal and cultural bonds, which were
in turn strengthened by intermarriage between the court nobility. Maximilian
and Maria in particular had encouraged these and Philip II lent his support for
further unions later. People and not just royal titles united the Spanish realms,
the Italian states, the German lands, Hungary and Bohemia 36. Above all, the
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35     G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen..., op. cit., III, n. 187 pp. 447-450, Micheli
to the Doge, 15 July 1568; n. 188, pp. 455-457, 16 September 1568; n. 194, 28 August 1569,
p. 486, Micheli reported his words: “in questo negotio et dissidio di religione il rimedio dell’armi
et della forza non solo non è buono, ma è pessimo”; n. 209 p. 556, Tron to the Doge, 19 January
1575: “haveva nondimeno trovato nelli signori di Spagna più durezza di quella che haverebbe mai
pensato”. Maximilian’s view of Philip’s choices: Tron to the Doge, 13 March 1575, n. 211,
pp. 559-562. More on these negotiations in CODOIN, CXIII, esp. pp. 47-50, Monteagudo to
Philip II, 18 March 1575. See also P. RAUSCHER: “Kaisertum und hegemoniales Königtum:
Die kaiserliche Reaktion auf die niederländische Politik Philippps II. von Spanien”, in F.
EDELMAYER (ed.): Hispania-Austria II. Die Epoche Philipps II. (1556-1598), Vienna 1999,
pp. 57-88; P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., pp. 176-187 on his policy
towards the Low Countries.
36     P. MAREK: “Las damas de la emperatriz María y su papel en el sistema clientelar de
los reyes españoles. El caso de María Manrique de Lara y sus hijas”, in J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN
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Habsburgs were united in their determination to keep their lands in the hands
of the dynasty and the best way to achieve this was by marriage among the kin
group. The level of endogamy in the family was unusual, and created such
complex relationships language had to be stretched to describe them. When
Philip II married his niece Anna, the empress Maria reminded became brother’s
mother-in-law, as she gleefully reminded him. She also took some delight in
calling her daughter “my sister-in-law” 37. When the couple produced their first
son, however, even Maria became hopelessly entangled: 
I don’t think I could call him ‘The lord prince, my grandson’. When I
address him I will call him my nephew and my lord. I scarcely know by what
name I will love him more! 38. 
She later addressed Philip III as “The King, my Lord”, ending her letters: “I kiss
Your Majesty’s hands, Your grandmother” 39. Some found these transformations
difficult. After her marriage to Archduke Albert, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia
went to visit Maria who was now “her aunt and mother-in-law”, but was so used
to calling Albert “cousin” that she could not call him “husband” 40. 
The benefits of this policy were clear at the start of Philip II’s reign. In 1559,
after two marriages he had only one son, whose physical and mental faculties
were so defective as to make people doubt his capacity to rule. He contracted a
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& Mª. P. MARÇAL LOURENÇO (eds.): Las Relaciones Discretas entre las Monarquías Hispana y
Portuguesa: Las casas de las reinas (siglos XV-XIX), 3 vols., II, Madrid 2008, pp. 1003-1036.
At the court of Philip II Khevenüller presided over further marriages, Diario..., op. cit., pp.
314-315; p. 341; p. 429.
37     María to Philip, [1570], “el camino de la Reyna, y de my cuñada, que mucho uelgo de
llamárselo... de serle suegra...”, en J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario
de la emperatriz María de Austria, op. cit., n. 28, p. 207. 
38     María to Philip, 16 January 1572, “más no será posible que yo le llame el señor Prínçipe,
mi nieto. Cuando esto uviese de ser le llamaré sobrino y mi señor y no sé por cual nombre le querré
más” (J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María de
Austria, op. cit., n. 41, p. 232).
39     J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María de
Austria, op. cit., n. 65, p. 272: “Besa las manos a vuestra Majestad su güela. Al Rei, mi señor”.
40     My thanks to Luc Duerloo and Almudena Pérez de Tudela for reminding me of this.
H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 479 mentions that “la nueua desposada vissitó y
saludó con mucho amor a su tía y suegra”. 
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third marriage to seal the peace with France. Since Elizabeth of Valois was
thirteen years old she was not expected to produce heirs for some time, if at all.
Consequently, Ferdinand I reckoned that one of his grandsons might well
inherits the Spanish Monarchy 41. Philip II thought likewise, and begged Maria
and Maximilian to send some of their sons to be educated in his court, which
happened to be in Castile at this point. Maria was delighted, hoping to protect
her children from what she considered to be pernicious and dangerous
influences at the imperial court. Maximilian II hesitated for cogent reasons.
Sending a son to another’s court was common but was regarded as the action of
an inferior. By giving his sons an education in a Catholic court, he would be seen
to have privileged this camp over the Protestants and so make a difficult situation
in the Holy Roman Empire worse. His own residence in Charles V’s court
during 1544-1548 had been an unhappy experience. He commented that the
only thing he learnt there was the art of dissimulation 42. Even if that were
the case, it would have been worth the stay, as this was a vital skill. Ultimately, the
possibility of getting a fabulous inheritance and securing Philip II’s support for
his growing family was too important to pass over and Maximilian sent his two
eldest sons. 
On the 17 March 1564 Rudolf and Ernest arrived in Barcelona where Philip
II was waiting impatiently to greet them. Unable to land where a covered coach
awaited them –a sign of great distinction– they had to disembark on a nearby
beach. Instead of following protocol and waiting at a distance, Philip II headed
out along the beach and embraced them. The king’s joy was such that the
Portuguese ambassador commented that all his worries and anger had vanished
in that instant 43. Until 1570 the two archdukes lived at Philip II’s court, as
much an integral part of his private life as of all public functions 44. Maximilian
II had not expected them to stay so long but Philip II was desperate to keep
them there, especially after the imprisonment of don Carlos in January 1568.
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41     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., p. 43, p. 51 and p. 59.
42     Ibidem, p. 13.
43     ANTT, Consello Geral do Santo Oficio, Libro 105, fol. 101. Francisco Pereira to
Sebastian I, 20 March 1564.
44     E. MAYER-LÖWENSCHWERDT: Der Aufenthalt der Erzherzoge Rudolf und Ernst in
Spanien 1564-1571, Vienna & Leipzig 1927.
II.1 Rguez Salgado_Maquetación 1  25/04/11  16:04  Página 348
He wrote with some pathos: “I thought that while I no longer have him now, at
least I have my nephews as my sons” 45. He cared for them as if they were his
own children. He stayed up all night with them when they were ill; he bought
them presents; he treated them with fatherly affection; he arranged for their
first communion to be done in good time. Although the emperor kept a close
eye on their education, it was Philip II who inducted them into a public
functions appertaining to royalty and who influenced them in many ways 46. 
Since it was unclear whether he or the emperor could rightly claim to be the
Head of the dynasty, Philip II found himself without the authority his father had
wielded to impose his will on the marriage of the Austrian archdukes. There
were sharp clashes during the 1560s over the marriage of archduchess Elizabeth.
Philip II and his sisters wanted her for Sebastian I of Portugal; Maximilian II
wanted to raise the status of his family by a marriage to the king of France, and
she was duly married to Charles IX 47. The emperor was also adamant that his
eldest daughter Anna must marry Don Carlos, opposing other matches
proposed for him and sweeping aside Philip II’s later arguments that it would be
better for him not to marry. He even offered to arrange for Carlos to be elected
as King of the Romans in 1568 to make the match more attractive. As he
explained to the Venetian ambassador, with six sons and three daughters and
without means to sustain them, he had to tap into the resources of the Spanish
Monarchy. He also hoped Rudolf would marry one of Philip II’s daughters 48.
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45     “Tampoco puedo dexar de confesar que he sentido tiernamente esta demanda por haber
venido puntualmente sobre el caso del Príncipe, que me tiene tan lastimado como podéis juzgar, y
parésceme que en falta dél me quedaban mis sobrinos por hijos”, Philip II to Maximilian, 28
January 1568, cit. J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la
emperatriz María de Austria, op. cit., p. 60 from CODOIN, CI, p. 358
46     E. MAYER-LÖWENSCHWERDT: Der Aufenthalt der Erzherzoge Rudolf und Ernst..., op.
cit., p. 32.
47     It caused great offence to the Portuguese as can be seen in the correspondence of the
ambassador at Philip II’s court, ANTT, Consello Geral do Santo Oficio, Libro 105. 
48     G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen..., op. cit., III, n. 180, Micheli to the Doge,
Vienna, 13 November 1567, pp. 415-416. Bemoaning “l’oppressione et totale desolatione di
questa fameglia”, Maximilan gave Micheli to undertand that his chief aim “è il stabelimento
[!] di casa sua mediante la unione con quella di Spagna”, p. 415. P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor
Maximilian II, op. cit., pp. 109-110 emphasises Maximilian’s insistence on the marriage
with Carlos.
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After Carlos’ death, he readily agreed to a match between Anna and Philip II
and marked it with the most lavish celebrations of his reign 49.
Anna set out for Spain in 1570 with another two brothers, Albert and Wenzel,
who were “to be the companions of His Catholic Majesty and fill the gap that will
be left by the departure of those who must return now”. Reluctantly parting from
Rudolf and Ernest, Philip II was duly grateful: “to have them here will be as
pleasing to me as if they were my sons” 50. Rudolf must have left Spain with very
mixed feelings. From a young age, in the imperial court, he had been taught that
he would one day wear the imperial crown, the most elevated title in the world,
and so become the head of Christendom, as well as head of the house of
Habsburg. When he arrived in Spain the Portuguese ambassador was struck by
the twelve-year old’s great authority – “tem autoridade domen” 51. That sense of
majesty and power must have deepened over the following years when he was
regarded and treated as the heir to the Spanish Monarchy. He was groomed to
succeed to two great empires. The birth of his cousin-nephew, Fernando, in 1571
displaced him from the succession. At the very least he must have felt
disappointed and one wonders if this explains why, for a time, he refused to write
to Philip II 52. For his part, the king continued to use paternal language. He
instructed his ambassador to congratulate Rudolf on his coronation as king of
Hungary and to say that: “he will find in me all the favour and support he would
have if he were my son, for that is what I consider him to be” 53. Maria claimed
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49     T. DACOSTA KAUMANN: Variations on the Imperial Theme in the age of Maximilian II
and Rudolf II, New York & London 1978, pp. 28-33; K. VOCELKA: Habsburgische hochzeiten,
1500-1600, Vienna etc. 1976, chp. VI, festivities for Anna and Elizabeth in 1570.
50     J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María
de Austria, op. cit., p. 62: “hicieren compañía a S. M. Católica y suplan la soledad que le ha de
causar la ausencia de los que agora se van”; “sera para mí el tenerlos acá de tanto contentamiento
como si fueran mis hijos”.
51     ANTT, Consello Geral do Santo Oficio, Libro 105, fol. 101, Francisco Pereira to
Sebastian, Barcelona 20 March 1564.
52     J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María de
Austria, op. cit., n. 57 p. 261, María to Princess Juana, 20 september [no year] “nunca he
podi[do] acabar , que Rodolfo escriva a mi hermano como es rrazón”. 
53     CODOIN, CXI, Philip II to the count of Monteagudo, 14 November 1572, p. 53:
“asegurándole que en mí terná para ello todo el favor y asistencia que si fuera mi hijo, que en este grado
le tengo”.
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that Rudolf shared such sentiments “and does not consider the emperor to be
more of a father than my brother is” 54. 
The young man who had expected to get so much found himself for a time
in danger of not getting the Holy Roman Empire either. As Maximilian II’s
health deteriorated he was under pressure to secure the imperial succession for
the Austrian Habsburgs by ensuring one of them was elected as King of the
Romans. The last time there was an open election, Francis I, Henry VIII and
the duke of Saxony had attempted to take the title and now they did not have the
financial resources of Charles V to bribe the electors. Moreover, several of them
were now Protestants, making it more difficult to fix the election for a Catholic
Habsburg. It was argued, however, that the King of the Romans had to be an
adult, ready to take over the empire if the Emperor was ill or busy in own
territories – much as Ferdinand I had done for Charles V. Archduke Charles was
an obvious choice, but rejected because he was too poor. That was the other key
criterion. The title-holder required substantial means and authority which only
a considerable territorial base guaranteed. Maria initially supported Charles’
candidacy, considering Rudolf too young to be given such a weighty office.
Later, she appreciated that if Rudolf was not elected King of the Romans now
he might never become emperor 55.
In 1574, having secured Rudolf II’s election to the thrones of Bohemia and
Hungary, Maximilian II prepared his election as King of the Romans. He sent
special envoys to Madrid to obtain Philip II’s support. He also asked for aid to
ensure that one the archdukes became king of Poland and requested substantial
offices and titles for archdukes Albert and Wenzel. Philip II agreed to all of this
and added that he did so with “pleasure and contentment”. The imperial family
thanked him and assured him they would know how to reciprocate such generosity
with loyalty and service 56. On 9 October 1575 Rudolf was duly crowned King of
the Romans 57. 
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54     CODOIN, CX, p. 56, Monteagudo to Philip II, 17 November 1572: “mi hijo... no
reconosce al Emperador por más padre que á mi hermano”.
55     J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María de
Austria, op. cit., p. 62.
56     CODOIN, CXIII, p. 39, Philip II to Monteagudo, 26 February 1575: “sabeis el gusto y
contentamiento que terné de entenderlo; lo mismo será de lo de Polonia”. Reaction of the imperial
family: “hallándose cada dia de nuevo obligados á servir y reconoscer la merced que Vuestra magestad
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It is worth noting that Philip II was behaving as a responsible and caring
head of House. “As I hold Prince Ernest, my nephew, in place of my own son...”
was how he prefaced his orders to support the archduke’s bid for the Polish
throne. To encourage those who had not come to his court, he assured them he
would favour them also “as if they were my own sons”. His nieces were
addressed in fatherly fashion: “speak to them of the love I have for them all”,
he wrote in 1576, “which, as you know is no less than if they were my own
children” 58. Words were backed by deeds. He provided money as well as his
enthusiasm to support Ernest and Maximilian’s bid for Poland, and for years he
tried to arrange suitable marriages for them. Fichtner describes Maximilian II’s
attitude in this respect as “inexplicable”. Other than the two eldest girls and
Rudolf, he made virtually no provision for his children. Indeed, she argues that
his “apparent indifference” to his sons’ interests in Poland led to their failure
to secure that crown 59. By contrast, Philip II’s credentials as father and head of
the dynasty were impeccable. In 1576 he supported Rudolf II’s election as Holy
Roman Emperor. It was generally believed it would soon be followed by his
marriage. Doubtless, Philip II expected some say in the matter. 
THE MAKING OF A PERFECT MATCH: 1570-1582
From the moment that Elizabeth of Valois was known to be pregnant there
was speculation that if it was a girl she would marry Rudolf. The rumour may
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les hace, y así usarán della en su tiempo, aunque desean no dar pesadumbre á Vuestra Magestad
sino servir en esta conformidad.”; pp. 54-55, Monteagudo to Philip II, 18 March 1575. H.
KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 100.
57     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
58     CODOIN, CXIII, p. 145, Philip II to Monteagudo, 14 July 1575: “Por tener en lugar de
hijo al Principe Ernesto, mi sobrino, he holgado mucho de entender el buen camino que paresce se
lleva en el negocio de Polonia”; p. 149, 14 July, “he de procurar todo su bien como si fueran mis
hijos”; p. 402, 30 June 1576, speak to my nieces and nephews, “representándoles el amor que
á todos les tengo, pues sabeis no es menos que si fueran mis hijos”.
59     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., p. 202: “Maximilian’s neglect, not
only of Rudolf but of all his sons’ marital needs, is inexplicable”. She alludes to his
“apparent indifference” over Poland, pp. 202-205; first communion rows pp. 212-213. 
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have been part of a strategy to hinder negotiations for him to marry a French
princess, but it was a realistic prospect despite the age gap 60. Isabel Clara
Eugenia was born on 12 August 1566, and she was followed by a sister, Catalina
Micaela. In 1568 Philip II commented: “the greatest consolation I have ... is to
think that my sisters have sons and I have daughters”. A year later he indicated
his willingness to consider a match between Rudolf and Isabel 61. In 1570 the
empress Maria made the proposal. Since the minimum marriageable age for
girls was 12 and Rudolf was already 18, there was considerable opposition to
this since it would delay his marriage and the chance of producing heirs. Maria
argued that he could afford to wait and that the prospect of such a valuable
marriage would have a salutary effect on him, ensuring he behaved well and
remained a good Catholic. Significantly, she added that the match would
facilitate Rudolf ’s succession to the Spanish Monarchy. Later, aware of the
powerful opposition to the unification of the two Habsburg empires, she
assured Philip II that if Rudolf succeeded in Spain “he would have no
difficulty” in abandoning his kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, “even if he
were already King of the Romans”. The advantage for Philip II of agreeing to
the match at this stage was to take Rudolf out of the marriage market, yet he
decided not to pursue the match at this stage since his daughter was so young.
Much could happen in the intervening years to break the marriage. Maria
assured him that because of Isabel’s age, no one would blame him if he
subsequently withdrew from the commitment 62. The king wisely avoided
putting himself in such a situation. It invariably led to conflict.
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60     F. EDELMAYER & A. STROHMEYER (eds.): Die Korrespondenz der Kaiser mit ihren
Gesandten in Spanien, I. Briefwechsel 1563-1565. Munich 1997, n. 80, p. 335, Dietrichstein
to Harrach, Madrid, 9 February 1565.
61     “El mayor consuelo que tengo para lo presente y de adelante es considerar que mis
hermanos tienen hijos y yo hijas”, Philip II to Maximilian II, 28 January 1568, cit. J. C.
GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ: Epistolario de la emperatriz María de Austria, op.
cit., p. 60 from CODOIN, CI p. 358; Philip to Maximilian, 10 March 1569, CODOIN, CIII, pp.
159-160.
62     María to Philip, 29 May 1570 in J. C. GALENDE DÍAZ & M. SALAMANCA LÓPEZ:
Epistolario de la emperatriz María de Austria, op. cit., n. 21 p. 182; 29 November 1570, n. 27,
pp. 200-201, “es el mayor freno... para que sea bueno... Y para mi sobrina no me pareçe ques
inconviniente, pues todas las vezes que vos quixere, u cu[an]do ella fuese de edad, está en manos
de vos no pasar por esto”, also pp. 64-65, and p. 94 where CODOIN, CIII, p. 412 is quoted: “pide
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He might well have regretted it over the following years, however. Rumours
of a marriage between Rudolf and Margaret of Valois suggested that the Austrian
branch was drawing closer to the French 63. Worse still, in 1574 news spread that
he might marry Dorothea of Saxony. Her father was the leading Lutheran
prince and one of the most powerful figures in the Holy Roman Empire and
his support would have substantially strengthened the young emperor within
the Empire and against the Turks. It was said that Philip II was horrified at the
thought of Rudolf marrying a Protestant and that he wanted the emperor to
marry his daughter Isabel 64. When Maximilian II visited Saxony in 1575,
rumours spread that it was to conclude the marriage, but Philip II’s ambassador,
the count of Monteagudo, reassured him that the Austrians were too dependent
on his support to do something he was so vehemently opposed to 65.
In fact, the journey had been part of a charm offensive to gain support for
Rudolf ’s election. The German nobles were deeply suspicious of possible
Spanish influences, exacerbated when on his return he appeared at a tournament
as the Spanish Knight 66. Many suspected that Rudolf was not just pretending
to be a Spanish knight. Criticisms of Rudolf had spread rapidly, fanned by
countless, unsubstantiated rumours 67. By 1575 Maximilian II was sufficiently
concerned to take action. It appears that Rudolf: 
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con instancia que Rudolfo vaya a todo en lo de su casamiento, cuanto la edad lo sufriere, diciendo
que si acaso viniese a ser Rey de acá, sin dificultad podría dexar lo de allá, aunque fuese rey de
Romanos”. There are other letters relating to the match in this volume, as well as in CODOIN,
vols. 110 and 111.
63     K. VOCELKA: Habsburgische hochzeiten..., op. cit., p. 16.
64     G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen..., op. cit., III, n. 207, pp. 548-549, Tron to
Doge, 26 November 1574: “Li Spagnoli non lo possono consentire”; n. 212 p. 564, Vicenzo
Tron to the Doge, 4 April 1575. Rumours she might marry a French prince in 1571 p. 544
note 2.
65     CODOIN, CXIII, pp. 90-93 (to Philip II, 8 April 1575), p. 96 resumé of letters from
March and April.
66     K. VOCELKA: Habsburgische hochzeiten..., op. cit., ch. IV, detailed description of the
multiple ceremonies organised for the marriage of archduke Charles and Maria of Bavaria,
also T. DACOSTA KAUMANN: Variations on the Imperial Theme..., op. cit., pp. 37-38.
67     P. S. FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., p. 200.
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was perceived to be very Spanish (muy españolado) in his eating and drinking
habits, in his excessive concern with authority and ceremonial, and in the great
hypocrisy he demonstrated on ecclesiastical matters. 
The man in charge of his household, Adam Dietrichstein, was considered too
partial to Spain, but the emperor ordered him to deal with the matter; change
the offending customs and ensure that Rudolf adapted his manners to those of
his subjects. Dietrichstein defended Rudolf and the ensuing row cost him
Maximilian’s favour and his position at court 68. Perhaps this explains why soon
after Maximilian avoided an open conflict with his sons when Matthias and
Maximilian made their First Communion. He allowed them to choose how they
would take communion. They all chose the traditional, Catholic style 69.
Clearly, one did not need to have been resident in Spain to remain a traditional
Catholic. 
When the Duke of Saxony and the marquis of Brandenburg met Rudolf II in
May 1575, however, they declared that his behaviour and character were quite
unlike what they had heard and feared 70. Whether this was true or proof of their
tact, expectations continued to affect how people responded to him. They
assumed he would be “Spanish” and the association with Spain was usually
pejorative, especially in the context of religion. When the English Protestant
nobleman, Sir Philip Sydney, met Rudolf II in 1577 he declared him “extreemely
Spaniolated”, essentially because he was a man of “few of wordes, sullein of
disposition, very secrete and resolute” 71. Lazarus Schwendi claimed Rudolf ’s
revocation of some concessions made to the Protestants was due to his “Spanish
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68     Dietrichstein’s fate in F. EDELMAYER: Söldner und Pensionäre. Das netzwerk Philipps
II. im Heiligen Römishen Reich, Vienna 2002, p. 81 and p. 83 note 115. Monteagudo to Philip
II, 28 March 1575, CODOIN, CXIII, p. 87: 
“ciertos avisos del Imperio que contienen las faltas que algunos ponian en la persona del
Rey Rodolfo, y la sustancia de todas era notarle de muy españolado en el comer y en el
beber, y en el guardar autoridad y ceremonia demasiada, y el ser muy hipócrita cerca de
las cosas eclesiásticas, que es á donde á estos les debe más de doler”.
69     CODOIN, CXIII, p. 89. Monteagudo to Philip II, 8 April 1575.
70     Ibidem, p. 117. Monteagudo to Philip II, 26 May 1575.
71     Sidney’s comment to Secretary Walsingham, 3 May 1577, cit by R. J. W. EVANS:
Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 122. In p. 50 he stresses Rudolf ’s “Spanishness”. P. S.
FICHTNER: Emperor Maximilian II, op. cit., describes Rudolf II as “an enthusiastic
hispanophile” pp. 107-108.
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prejudices” 72. In September 1585 a German informant assured the English
government that the German Catholics were seeking to extirpate Protestantism
with the support of the “espagnolizé” emperor and his supporters, chiefly the
Jesuits, and the association of Spain with an intolerant, Jesuit-inspired
Catholicism has become commonplace 73. This is ironic. Philip II certainly used
them, but he resisted all attempts to introduce them into the court. That happened
after his death and against his express orders, when Margaret of Austria, wife
to Philip III, was allowed to keep her Jesuit confessor. It was the Austrian branch
that brought them into the inner sanctum and allowed them direct influence over
government policy, not the other way round 74. 
The extent to which Rudolf ’s court was “Spanish” has been much debated.
His love of the language and fashions are indisputable, and he was naturally
surrounded by people who had been with him there. It is easy to see how some
of his habits and tastes might have been acquired from Philip II. But as Evans
and Vocelka have been at pains to point out, Rudolf II’s policies, not least on
religious matters, were close to those of Maximilian II. He kept his father’s
advisers and even his painters and courtiers 75. Moreover, it is now widely
realised that it is impossible to speak of a purely “Spanish” court. Philip II was
in the process of shaping an extraordinary amalgam of courtly traditions
–Castilian, Aragonese, Portuguese and Burgundian– into something congenial
during the years Rudolf lived there. The imperial court was similarly shaped by
the mixed experiences of Ferdinand I who introduced new ordinances in 1527
and 1537, blending Habsburg traditions with those of the court of the Catholic
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72     Cit. H. LOUTHAN: The quest for compromise..., op. cit., p. 113.
73     Calendar of State Papers..., op. cit., vol. XX, pp. 49-50, J. Schwartz to Davison, 29
September 1585. H. HAUPT: “Kaiser Rudolf II. in Prag...”, op. cit., p. 48 refers to “dem
spanisch-jesuitischen Katholizismus wegen der ihm innewohnenden Intoleranz ablehnend
gegenüberstand”.
74     E. JIMÉNEZ PABLO: “Los jesuitas en la corte de Margarita de Austria: Ricardo Haller
y Fernando de Mendoza”, in J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN & Mª. P. MARÇAL LOURENÇO (eds.): Las
Relaciones Discretas..., op. cit., II, pp. 1971-1120, esp. 1074-1085; M. S. SÁNCHEZ,
“Confession and complicity: Margarita de Austria, Richard Haller, S.J., and the court of
Philip III”, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 14 (1993), pp. 133-149.
75     A key theme of R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit. K. VOCELKA: Rudolf
II. und seine Zeit, Vienna 1985, p. 52, where he also claims the Spanish court was
characterised by “strengen katholischen Atmosphäre”.
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Monarchs in which he was raised and the Low Countries where he had lived 76.
The most distinctive characteristic of the early-modern princely courts is the
cosmopolitan nature of their culture and customs and their active emulation of
others. 
The negative association with Spain had some positive aspects. When
Rudolf II did something pleasing, praise was attached only to him, as the
exchange with the Venetian ambassador in October 1576 demonstrates. Tron
informed him that the world expected a great deal from him, not least because of
his regal and singular qualities Rudolf ’s reply was textbook perfect: without a
doubt they would realise that he was inferior to his predecessors in all but his
esteem and affection for the Venetian Republic. It was the kind of thing Philip II
would have said, but Tron made no allusion to Spanish influences. Instead he
praised Rudolf ’s assured handling of the situation and the moderation he had
shown, noting that it exceeded their expectations of him 77. It is interesting to
note that the seemingly insidious influence of “Spain” does not appear in
connection with Ernest, who was just as exposed as his brother, arguably at a
more impressionable age. 
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76     Useful starting points in English on the court: J. DUINDAN: “The Archduchy of Austria
and the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary. The Courts of the Austrian Habsburgs c.1500-
1750”, in J. ADAMSON (ed.): The princely courts of Europe, 1500-1700, London 1999, pp. 165-
187; and G. REDWORTH and F. CHECA: “The Kingdoms of Spain. The Courts of the Spanish
Habsburgs, 1500-1700”, ibidem, pp. 42-65. J. ELLIOT: “The court of the Spanish Habsburgs: a
peculiar institution?” in his Spain and its World, 1500-1700, London 1989; M. J. RODRÍGUEZ
SALGADO: “The court of Philip II of Spain”, in R. G. ASCH and A. M. BIRKE (eds.): Princes,
Patronage and Royalty, 1400-1800, Oxford 1991, pp. 205-244, and “Honour and profit in the
court of Philip II of Spain”, in M. AYMARD and M. A. ROMANI (eds.): La Cour comme institution
économique, Paris 1998, pp. 67-86. J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN has coordinated an impressive series
of publications in Spanish on the theme including: La corte de Felipe II, Madrid 1994; La Corte
de Carlos V, 5 vols, Madrid 2000; La Monarquía de Felipe II. La Casa del Rey, 2 vols., Madrid
2005, as well as multi-volume conference proceedings cited in these notes. Ch. HOFMANN’s Das
Spanishe Hofzeremoniell von 1500-1700, 1985, remains a useful source.
77     G. TURBA (ed.): Venetianische Depeschen..., op. cit., III, n.220 p. 599, Tron to the
Doge, Regensburg, 12 October 1576: 
“superando l’aspettatione di tutti con molta prudentia et circonspettione ha licentiato la
dietta ... nell’audientia ... vendo à dirle quanto aspettava il mondo et la Ser.tà Vostra ancora
dalle regie et singolar qualità sue, ... mi disse che senza fallo si scoprirebbe inferiore di qualità
alli Imperatori passati, ma non già in amar et stimar quella sern.ma republica, quanto ella
merita”.
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Much can be learnt about Rudolf II’s world view from his actions
immediately after his father’s death. They reveal a man determined to realise
the majesty of his office as Holy Roman Emperor. He identified with and
sought to emulate Charles V – according to Haupt a direct influence from his
residence in the Spanish court. But he showed similar veneration for
Maximilian I and other successful emperors. He encouraged works on the
Habsburg dynasty as part of his lavish patronage of the arts which contributed
to his image as God’s appointed, destined to rule over the empire and the
House 78. Perhaps his fears that he would not get the imperial title help to
explain the extraordinary funeral obsequies he organised for his father, which
far exceeded the grandeur of earlier ceremonies. Choreographed to the last
detail, the funeral journey from Regensburg to Prague between 12 October
1576 and 22 March 1577 was used to project a majestic image of the emperor.
He was the embodiment of the heroic warrior, the just lawgiver, the virtuous
ruler, the patron of the arts and protector of the weak. A harbinger of peace and
prosperity. None of this was new, nor the heavy reliance on imperial symbolism
and the dynasty’s commitment to Catholicism. But the scale was grand and the
ambition palpable. The official funeral oration linked Maximilian and Rudolf
with the emperor Constantine. One aspect is worth noting: the decision to
create a new mausoleum for the dynasty in Prague. St Vitus’ cathedral had an
ancient mausoleum for Bohemian kings. Ferdinand and Anna were buried there
and the cathedral is still decorated with the coats of arms of their respective
lands, including the various Spanish kingdoms. But Maximilian wanted to be
buried in Vienna. Rudolf II ignored this and planned a major mausoleum where
only his branch of the dynasty had its roots. There are parallels here to what
Philip II was doing in the monastery of San Lorenzo el Real in El Escorial
which Rudolf had visited. Both were potent, symbolic acts, creating a distinct
sacred space for their independent and great dynasties 79.
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78     H. HAUPT: “Kaiser Rudolf II. in Prag...”, op. cit., p. 47 and p. 50; R. J. W. EVANS:
Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 15; K. VOCELKA: Rudolf II. und seine Zeit, op. cit.,
confirms influence of Charles V’s image, p. 52.
79     T. DACOSTA KAUMANN: Variations on the Imperial Theme..., op. cit., pp. 5-15, p. 22ff.
his ceremonies and funeral; H. LOUTHAN: The quest for compromise..., op. cit., pp. 137-141
funeral and orations; R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 14 Habsburg
historiography; pp. 60-62 funeral and mausoleum.
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Rudolf ’s concern to establish his superior status was evident in other ways.
In 1578 he insisted that his brothers should acknowledge his overlordship
formally. Later, he would make his cousin Maximilian of Tyrol promise total
obedience and “humbly and completely bow ... before Yr Majesty’s gracious and
sovereign will” 80. This may explain the way he reacted to Philip II. The king’s
ambassador at the imperial court was exposed to a degree of harshness he had
not expected, or it seems, experienced. Edelmayer reckons that Monteagudo’s
complaints were the cause of his frustration and weariness. He had been there
too long. Yet Monteagudo had a point. Rudolf II did not overturn many of his
father’s policies or reinstate the pro-Spanish Dietrichstein 81. More to the point,
and contrary to expectations, he refused to cede Finale to Philip II, declaring
that he would not tolerate any breach of imperial authority in the region. He
negotiated with the Grand-Duke of Tuscany without informing Philip II, thus
showing his desire to act independently in the region 82. It was not until 28
February 1579, well after Philip II had offered to “swear faithfully and render
homage” for Milan and Pavia, that the official documents for his investiture and
confirmation of his powers to subinfeudate Siena were issued 83. 
It did not take long for their relations to became strained as a result of events
in the Low Countries, and yet it appeared at first as if the situation there would
bring them closer. Shortly before Rudolf II became emperor Philip II had lost
control over the region. His unpaid army had run amok and all but one of the
provinces allied to drive out “the Spanish army”. The king turned to Rudolf II,
who was eager to intervene and mediate a settlement 84. Archduke Matthias put
paid to this initiative by accepting the invitation of a group of rebels to go there
and take over the governorship. It is still not clear what part Rudolf II played in
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80     Cit. in R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 39, also his remarks on
p. 14.
81     F. EDELMAYER: Söldner und Pensionäre..., op. cit., p. 84. Philip II now worked with
Leonhard von Harrach, pp. 88-90. 
82     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 162 complaints of Monteagudo, by then
marquis of Almazán.
83     AGS, PR, 44, doc. 26, draft of powers from Philip II to Don Juan de Borja to request
the investiture of Milan s.d.; PR,.44, doc.18, Investiture for Milan etc.; PR, 46, doc. 68 ns.
1 & 2 Siena.
84     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 117-120.
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this extraordinary action. Philip II initially blamed him but when Rudolf II
denied any involvement, the king either accepted his word or dissimulated,
which amounted to the same thing. Rudolf II appears to have known about it,
and at the very least, did nothing to prevent his brother’s bid for the Low
Countries. This is in keeping with his actions in Italy: he was doing everything
in his power to preserve or recover imperial lands and authority. Still desperate
for a solution, in 1578 Philip II once again entrusted him with negotiations for
peace. Interestingly, the rebels responded by trying to persuade Rudolf II to
join them by providing support for Mathias. They argued that the region was
part of the Holy Roman Empire and therefore “the cause rightly appertains to
your Cesarian Majesty and is within your authority”. They asserted his right
to act as judge and arbiter and their belief that he had “power to settle all divisions
and differences in the whole of Christendom” 85. 
Unsurprisingly, many of Philip II’s advisers feared Rudolf II’s intervention.
Monteagudo, recently arrived from the imperial court, argued vehemently
against giving him any influence over the Low Countries. After all, neither he
nor his predecessors had helped Philip II in the past. The imperial ambassador
in Madrid commented provocatively that this was true: they could not have
taken the side of injustice. Monteagudo angrily retorted that they should not be
surprised, therefore, if Philip II revenged himself by allowing a Turkish invasion
of Eastern Europe. Both men were reproved for their bad-tempered exchange,
but it indicates the depth of passion that surrounded these debates. Some
counsellors, including the duke of Alba, were in favour of the emperor’s
intervention. But when he was informed of the conditions Rudolf II wanted to
impose, he commented that either Rudolf II had no understanding whatsoever
of the issues at stake, or else he had been seduced by the “malcontent” rebels 86. 
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85     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 128 (Mathias) pp. 154-168 peace
negotiations. Cits. p. 155: 
“suplican y ruegan a su magestad cesárea que tenga misericordia de las prouincias de Flandes,
que no son la menor parte del Imperio, y acuda a su hermano Mathías y a los estados en la
causa que toca priuatiuamente a su magestad cesárea, y con su autoridad, con la qual como
juez y árbitro señalado tiene poder de componer todas las dissenciones y diferencias del orbe
christiano, haga de suerte que apagado con breuedad antes que más se encienda el fuego de las
guerras ciuiles se haga paz en estas prouincias con igualdad y justicia”. 
On Mathias see also H. LOUTHAN: The quest for compromise..., op. cit., pp. 144-151. 
86     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 161-163.
II.1 Rguez Salgado_Maquetación 1  25/04/11  16:04  Página 360
The French invasion, led by the duke of Alençon, caused further alarm and
exacerbated the problems. The Holy Roman Empire was now directly threatened
by the instability in the region. The French had alliances with the Turks and with
some of the German princes who opposed the emperor. Rudolf II argued that if
Philip II lacked the power to prevent the conquest of the region he would act as
befitted his own interests. These unspecific threats were accompanied by
suggestions that Philip II should end the crisis by supporting Mathias and grant
religious toleration, and by demands that he give Rudolf II full powers to
negotiate a settlement. Khevenhüller suggested that Philip should “tell him that
since he is your nephew and you consider him not just this, but also your son,
you entrust the matter in his hands without conditions”. Some ministers were
willing to give Matthias a chance now, but neither they nor Philip II would go
this far 87. Nevertheless, Rudolf II mediated in the ensuing negotiations only to
find that the rebels were as intransigent as the king. The settlement failed and
not long afterwards, in October 1581, Matthias left the Low Countries in
disgrace.
Throughout the crisis, Philip II tried carefully, not only because he was
anxious to have good relations with his nephew, but because he was soon made
aware that Rudolf II was unwell and probably not in control. From 1578 to 1581
he fell ill intermittently. In May 1579 don Juan de Borja informed Philip II that
Rudolf II was melancholic and mistrustful. At times he was so gripped by fear
that he would wake up at night repeatedly and call his servants. If it happened
during the day, he would refuse to leave his chamber. He showed no interest in
government, leaving matters unattended while he devoted all his time and
energy to the arts and scientific pursuits, or to games 88. Fears for his health
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87     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit.: 
“que su mag[esta]d cesárea mirasse por sí y por los suyos primeram[en]te porque se podía
temer que si al francés le sucedían bien las cosas en Flandes que auía de intentar lo mismo
en el Imperio, no sin gran daño ... principalmente porque el francés hallaría en el Imperio
muchos que le fauorecerían ... y se vniría con el turco” (p. 165); 
“para atapar y remediar en parte este neg[oci]o v[uestra] mag[esta]d lo remitiesse
libremente en manos del emperador sin reseruación ninguna ...dos ringlones de su propia
mano, diziéndole que siendo su sobrino y teniéndolo no solo por tal pero también por hijo
se lo remite libremente en sus manos, teniendo por cierto que mirará tanto por lo que toca
a la autoridad y honrra de v[uestra] mag[esta]d como la suia propia” (pp. 166-167).
88     B. CHUDOBA: España y el Imperio, op. cit., p. 262.
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made the question of his marriage urgent because it put a premium on the
succession. According to Khevenhüller, however, what prompted Rudolf II to
raise the matter was the rumour that there were negotiations –supported by the
pope– for the infanta Isabel to marry the duke of Alençon 89. Another, simpler
explanation can explain the timing of the proposal: Isabel had reached the
minimum marriageable age. What matters most is that, as the empress Maria
reminded her son later, 
it was he who had first proposed and made a bid for this marriage, and who not
only tried to persuade the king, don Philip, to allow it and give his consent, but
even urged all haste” 90.
As was to happen repeatedly, the marriage was inextricably mixed with other
matters. Since Maximilian II’s death, Maria had asked to be allowed to return
to Spain. Philip II urged her to stay at the imperial court. She was invaluable to
him there. His ambassadors had constant recourse to her and thus an open door
to the court where she remained influential 91. By the same token she was
useful to Rudolf II since she provided an alternative and informal vehicle for
communicating with Philip II. In 1579 she again asked permission to go to
Spain, arguing that this would facilitate the marriage negotiations. Philip II let
it be known he was favourable to the match but neither he nor Rudolf II wanted
Maria to leave the imperial court. Chudoba suggests that Rudolf ’s hostility to
her departure was due to his hostility to Spain, but provides no evidence. The
death of Queen Anna in 1580 changed Philip II’s attitude. He wanted his sister
back either to step into her daughter’s role of looking after the royal children
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89     Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, vol. VIII: 1558-1580, ed. Rawdon Brown and G.
Cavendish Bentinck, London 1890, n. 799 p. 635, Lorenzo Priuli from the French court, 24
March 1580, and p. 636. 
90     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 315: “auiéndolo él mismo primero mouido y
intentado y aun dado prisa y persuadido al rey don Felipe que viniesse en ello y diesse su
consentimiento”.
91     Philip II to María, 13 December 1576 in L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe
II..., op. cit., III, pp. 1489-1490. Her role briefly explored in: M. S. SÁNCHEZ: “Los vínculos
de sangre: la emperatriz María, Felipe II y las relaciones entre España y Europa central”, in
J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN (ed.): Felipe II (1527-1598). Europa y la Monarquía Católica, 3 vols,
1(2) pp. 777-793; J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN: “La emperatriz María y las pugnas cortesanas en
tiempos de Felipe II”, in J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN (ed.): Felipe II y el Mediterráneo. La
monarquía y los reinos (I), vol. III, Madrid 1999. 
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and providing a fitting head for the women at court, or to act as a governor for
one of the many states of the Monarchy. Rudolf II reluctantly gave in; partly it
appears because he was persuaded that this was the best and quickest way to
conclude the marriage negotiations 92. 
Speed was of the essence since Rudolf II was under a great deal of pressure
from members of the family to appoint a successor. In 1581 Charles of Styria
requested the election of one of the archdukes as King of the Romans. Rudolf
II refused and Evans reckons that from this moment onwards he became
mistrustful of his immediate family, and determined to force them to
acknowledge his superiority, even to the point of humiliating them and
meddling in their internal affairs. He demonstrated the same, obsessive
concern for loyalty and obedience from his advisers. His “exalted code of
majesty would brook no half measures”, Evans argues, prompting him to refuse
to go to Rome to be crowned emperor because it might be interpreted as “a
gesture of Imperial submissiveness” 93. This might well have influenced him,
but Rudolf II had other reasons for opposing the coronation. It would have
raised expectations of an immediate election for King of the Romans. Another
way in which he sought to impose his imperial authority was by attempting to
halt the levy of German troops by foreign powers. When Philip II reminded
him that his predecessors had accepted these arrangements, Rudolf II brushed
this aside and did what he could to prevent new contracts. He was no more
effective than his predecessors 94.
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92     H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 188-189, pp. 220-211, p. 251-256. B.
CHUDOBA: España y el Imperio, op. cit., pp. 259-260.
93     R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 55, pp. 58-59, ministers p. 63ff
and quote p. 64, Rome p. 87. He reckons Rudolf opposed Matthias’ activities in the Low
Countries because he was “stealing the wind from his own sails”, p. 60 
94     F. EDELMAYER: Söldner und Pensionäre..., op. cit., p. 166. He opposed Ferdinand’s
pension in 1578.
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THE CRUEL GAME OF MARRIAGE: 1582-1590 95
The empress Maria left Prague in August 1581, much later than expected,
due to financial problems and the difficulty of finding a suitable retinue 96. She
arrived in Madrid in March 1582 and from there travelled to Lisbon for talks
with Philip II. It did not take long for them to come to an agreement. On 2 June
1582 the emperor was asked to send the formal authorisation to conclude the
marriage. Two unfinished documents in the Viennese archives dated February
and August 1582 demonstrate that the process of drawing up the requisite papers
had started but they were never completed. For Vocelka they prove the emperor’s
chronic indecision 97. For three years, Rudolf II refused to address the issue. This
situation was so unusual and so delicate, involving as it did, family relations and
the honour of Philip II and his eldest daughter and potential heir that much of the
ensuing negotiations were done in secret. To piece them together we have to rely
on limited and sometimes coded information, being heavily reliant on the
account of Khevenhüller. The substantive negotiations were carried out by word
of mouth and this was not always easy. As Archduke Ernest commented in a letter
to Guillén de San Clemente, then Philip II’s ambassador at the imperial court,
the matter “cannot be dealt with in letters. I am sorry that I cannot do it by word
of mouth either, as there is no lack of material to discuss” 98.
The emperor’s silence was embarrassing and painful not just because Isabel’s
fate hung in the balance, but because it affected her sister Catalina. It was
honourable and normal for the eldest female to marry before her younger female
siblings, particularly if she had important dynastic rights. Philip II had been under
pressure since 1580 to agree to the of Carlo Emanuele of Savoy and Catalina and
gave his assent in 1583 when he still expected Isabel’s marriages to go ahead. He
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95     Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland (1584/5-1590). Die Nuntiatur am Kaiserhofe. Erst
Hälfte. Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, ed. R. Reichenberger, Paderborn 1905, n.
130 pp. 291, “non mostrando S. Maestà molta inclinatione di sottoporsi al gioco del matrimonio”.
96     E. SCHODER: “Die Reise der Kaiserin María nach Spanien (1581/82)”, in F.
EDELMAYER (ed.): Hispania-Austria II..., op. cit., pp. 151-179, esp. pp. 152-157, 178. 
97     K. VOCELKA: Die Politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1576-1612), Vienna
1981, pp. 174-175.
98     Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia inédita de Don Guillén de San Clemente,
Zagaroza 1892, n. LXXXV, p. 175, 25 December 1590, “De los otros negocios no ay q.e tratar
por cartas. Pésame no poderlo hazer de boca, q.e no faltaría q.e dezir”.
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delayed Catalina’s match as long as he could, but he could not risk alienating or
dishonouring Savoy, who might turn to France. Reluctantly, in 1585 he allowed the
marriage to go ahead despite the dishonour this entailed for Isabel 99.
Rudolf ’s motives remain a mystery. Initially, the delay could be linked to
another bout of illness. After 1583 he may have been influenced by his passionate
affair with one of Jacopo Strada’s daughters, which eventually resulted in six
illegitimate children. By all accounts Rudolf II doted on one of them, Giuglio,
born in 1585. The hostility of some imperial counsellors to the Spanish match may
have played a part – some preferred an Italian or German princess 100. It may be,
as Evans argued, that he now believed the marriage to Isabel might compromise
his position as an arbiter in Christendom, since it would place him irrevocably in
the Catholic camp 101. I would argue that another aspect needs to be put into the
equation: the imperial succession. Rudolf II was under such pressure to appoint a
successor in 1582 that he asked the opinion of both his mother and Philip II on the
matter. Their response was unanimous: although they believed he would have
legitimate children, the danger of an interregnum in the Holy Roman Empire was
so great that it was imperative to elect an adult Habsburg as King of the Romans
immediately. They agreed that the best candidate was Ernest, and that giving him
the succession was “tantamount to passing it on to a son”. Later, aware that Rudolf
II might consider the election a threat to his own progeny, they suggested that
Ernest could be made to agree to elect the emperor’s son as his own successor.
Rudolf II appeared to accept their recommendations 102. The two issues were
inextricably linked – and on both the emperor was silent.
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99     P. MERLIN: Tra guerre e tornei. La corte sabauda nell’età di Carlo Emanuele I, Turin
1991, pp. 4-6.
100   R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., pp. 55-58; Prag um 1600, op. cit.,
I, p. 20; K. VOCELKA: Die Politische Propaganda..., op. cit., p. 175. 
101   R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 82. 
102   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 268 (1582): 
“passando en su hermano Ernesto era como si passara en vn hijo y que tranfiriéndole en
Ernesto era tener atención a que su magestad no tenía successión. Pero que si succediesse a
caso tener hijos su mgestad, el mismo Ernesto su hermano con todas sus fuerzas auía de
procurar el hijo de su hermano sucediesse en el lugar que tenía él”. 
K. VOCELKA: Die Politische Propaganda..., op. cit., pp. 178-179 makes it clear Ernest had
initiated the consultation.
II.1 Rguez Salgado_Maquetación 1  25/04/11  16:04  Página 365
Ernest was anxious to be the next King of the Romans and so was Archduke
Ferdinand. Both sought support within and outside the empire. Because Ernest
had the backing of Philip II and Maria, Ferdinand appealed to Rome.
Concerned about a possible Protestant succession, Rudolf II’s confessor entered
the fray, and urged the Archdukes to raise the matter during the family reunion
that Rudolf II organised in Prague in 1585 on the occasion of receiving the
Order of the Golden Fleece. They duly talked to him and he promised he would
soon make a decision 103. When this failed to materialise, the Pope demanded
that Rudolf II make immediate provision for the succession, by marrying or by
other means. He was convinced that if there was an interregnum, Saxony and
the Palatinate would engineer the election of a Protestant emperor. Jealous as he
was of Spanish power, he did not particularly favour the match with Isabel, but
what mattered most was to have a legitimate heir 104.
The empress Maria enlisted the help of three of her children to try to bring
an end to the matter – archdukes Ernest and Charles and Maria, now duchess of
Bavaria, who was close to Rudolf II. She wanted him either to marry Isabel or
to withdraw his candidacy, leaving her free to marry someone else. They were
enjoined to the strictest secrecy, but Ernest was empowered to enlist anyone with
sufficient influence over Rudolf to help secure a decision. By now both Maria
and Philip II were so uncertain of Rudolf II’s will to marry that they favoured
Isabel’s marriage to Ernest and there was already talk of giving them the Low
Countries 105. This greatly facilitated Ernest’s election as King of the Romans,
since it gave him a solid territorial and political base. Increasingly, Maria’s
efforts would focus on persuading Rudolf that if he did not wish to marry Isabel
he must allow Ernest to do so, and on Ernest’s election. He was thus the
favoured candidate for both these roles. Not surprisingly, Rudolf II became
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103   Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia... Guillén de San Clemente, op. cit., pp. 47-
48. Ernest recalled 13 May 1589, p. 147: 
“me acuerdo muy bien lo q.e me habló de él estando allí en Praga, y aun á los otros
Archiduques q.e entonces todos juntos lo acordamos á su Mgs. q.e nos respondió se
resoluería presto y tendría cuydado dél”.
104   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, op. cit.,
n. 100 p. 212, Malaspina to Sixtus V, Prague, 28 January 1586.
105   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 268, pp. 288-292 and the comments on p.
314 which show Philip II’s intention to give her the Low Countries.
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suspicious and even jealous. Maria found herself having to reassure him that she
did not prefer Ernest, and had not been advancing the latter to Rudolf ’s
detriment. What was at stake was to stop a stranger gaining Isabel’s hand and
with this, the Spanish Monarchy. Rudolf II continued to hold back from making
any commitment, but at some stage now he asked Maria to raise with Philip II
the transfer of the duchy of Milan. Both the empress and the imperial
ambassador were appalled. They argued that this was not the time to put
forward such a controversial request, and that if it were made a condition of the
marriage negotiations, it would effectively terminate them. Maria asked him to
desist and he did. Both she and Khevenhüller persisted with their demands that
Rudolf II should make up his mind about Isabel and must recognise Ernest as
King of the Romans immediately 106. The marriage and the succession
continued to be dealt with jointly until 1598. 
Khevenhüller blamed Rudolf ’s inexplicable behaviour on the pernicious
influence of one of his chief advisers, Wolf Rumpf zum Wielroß. A powerful
figure in the emperor’s court from the outset of the reign, the ambassador
claimed he had persuaded Rudolf II against marrying Isabel and encouraged
his obsession with alchemy and art to the point where the emperor would do
nothing else, refusing to attend to matters of government 107. It is difficult to
reconcile this with the fact that Rumpf was well thought of by Philip II and his
court. He had been with the archdukes in Spain and had executed some of
Maximilian’s more difficult missions during 1574-1576. He was married to a
Spanish noblewoman, Maria de Arco, and received a handsome pension from
Philip II after 1579 and various other favours in the 1590s. When he fell from
grace in 1600 the Spanish court considered it a great tragedy 108. It seems more
likely that Rudolf II had, as Khevenhüller put it, “great confusion in his soul
and in his mind” regarding the match, which rendered him insensitive and
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106   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 315-316
107   Ibidem, pp. 314-315. R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., pp. 71-72
claims Rumpf “came to control most important decisions” from the late 1580s until 1600
when he was dismissed. 
108   Edelmayer includes him as a key Spanish ally in the imperial court –Söldner und
Pensionäre..., op. cit., pp. 91-94– and does not mention Khevenhüller’s claim, nor does P.
MAREK: “Las damas de la emperatriz María...”, op. cit., pp. 1013-1014, where he describes
his Spanish connections. 
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unresponsive to the raft of arguments he and Maria employed to persuade him
to marry and to elect an emperor-in-waiting 109. 
There is an interesting secret report by one of Khevenhüller’s secretaries,
Joel Ladronner Schwartz, sometime before the end of December 1585, which
claims that Rudolf II would not marry because of his “ill health”, and that he
had also rejected Isabel because of “the perpetual residency which her husband
is to make in Spain”. Due to Philip II’s advancing age and the rapid death of
his sons –Carlos Lorenzo in 1575; Fernando 1578, Diego in 1582– it was now
widely believed that Isabel would inherit the Spanish Monarchy. His remaining
son, Philip, was reputed to be sickly and unlikely to survive. Schwartz claimed
that Philip II was under pressure by the Cortes to settle the succession by
ensuring that Isabel married someone who would reside in Spain. Some
favoured her marrying archduke Albert and wanted Philip II to seek papal
dispensation for him to abandon his clerical status so that he could do this.
Others supported a marriage between Isabel and Ernest and wanted the
archduke to be sent as governor of the Low Countries immediately. Rudolf II
was to be asked to mediate in peace negotiations with the rebels and with
Elizabeth I 110. 
Some clues to Rudolf II’s state of mind in 1585 may be gained once again by
examining what he was doing. The pageants he organised on the occasion of his
election to the Order of the Golden Fleece were the most lavish of his reign. Of
course, they were primarily a demonstration of his status and magnificence, and
provided an occasion for him to display his superior position with regards to
other males in his family 111. Yet he could not escape the fact that it was Philip
II who had the power to distribute this coveted honour. Charles V had handed
the most prestigious chivalric order in Christendom to his son rather than
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109   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 315: “le pesaua mucho que el emperador
tubiesse tanta confusión en su alma y entendimiento”.
110   Calendar of State Papers..., op. cit., vol. VII, pp. 207-208, 1585 (s.d. after 10th
December). “Observations on the state of Spain in November 1585, by Joel Ladronner de
Schwaz, gentleman, born in Tyrol, who has been fourteen years in Spain with the Emperor’s
ambassador Johannes Kevenhuller ... whose secretary this Joel Ladronner was for six years
in the Dutch tongue”. 
111   T. DACOSTA KAUMANN: Variations on the Imperial Theme..., op. cit., pp. 44ff.; the
1585 ceremonies pp. 46-47; 1597, pp. 47-48. He was struck by the way in which the Golden
Fleece appears in many of Arcimboldo’s works, pp. 92-94. 
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leaving it in the hands of the Holy Roman Emperor. The Austrian Habsburgs
had discussed creating a new Order of their own. The Order of the Lion of
Bohemia was touted under Maximilian II, but nothing had come of it 112. Was
the grandeur with which Rudolf II invested the occasion in 1585 a way to
associate himself indelibly with the Order, and to demonstrate that he should
possess it, because he alone had the status to sustain its superior position in
Christendom?
Not long after, Archimboldo unveiled one of his most enigmatic portraits of
Rudolf II as Vertumnus. The emperor’s bust is made up of multiple elements.
The genre had developed under Maximilian II but this was its apogee. Using
the interpretations of Archimboldo’s collaborators, Giovanni Baptista Fonteo
and G. Comanini, DaCosta Kaufman claims that the painting is the ultimate
projection of imperial power: 
the world is composed of the elements, and he who rules the elements controls the
world; so will the Emperor control the world of affairs and break the power of
the Turks. 
The elements have been: 
compelled to take new form by their Lord (the Dominus mundi, overlord of all
the kings of the world), because he holds the empire of the world, which
consists of the elements and is ruled during the seasons of the year. 
In Vertumnus the emperor “has undergone an apotheosis into the god of the
seasons”, who heralds the golden age 113. It is pertinent to note in this respect
Evans’ comment that the extraordinary collections Rudolf II was painstakingly
gathering, as well as his intellectual and wider patronage, were deliberately
intended to be on a grander scale than any others 114. The clearest manifestation
of his intent was the new imperial crown which was not finished until 1602.
Based on Dürer’s designs for Maximilian I it provided a link to that now
idealised monarch, but also to Charlemagne, whose crown it was intended to
emulate. Charlemagne was regarded as the greatest emperor after the fall of
Rome and since the twelfth century was regarded as a saint for his wars against
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112   T. DACOSTA KAUMANN: Variations on the Imperial Theme..., op. cit., p. 134 note 13.
113   Ibidem, Archimboldo’s imperial allegories pp. 76-102, cits. p. 90, p. 100 and p. 87
respectively. Comanini and Vetumnus, pp. 99-101.
114   R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 178.
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Turks and heretics 115. Such extreme displays of magnificence and the emphasis
on Rudolf II’s superiority suggest that he would be extremely sensitive to
anything he might interpret as an assault on his status, or to anyone who might
undermine or compete with him. Both the appointment of a successor and the
possibility that someone else would marry the most powerful heiress in
Christendom fell clearly into these categories.
Rudolf ’s silence on these two important issues was public knowledge and it
was grist to the rumour mills, which generated some ludicrous stories. In March
1586 William Norris, recently arrived from Gibraltar, informed the English
government that prince Philip suffered from leprosy and was kept alive by his
physicians; that Philip II had fallen in love with his daughter Isabel, who was “a
fair woman”, and had asked the pope to allow him to marry her. Accurate
information also circulated, such as the news from Prague in April 1586 which
confirmed that the emperor was still silent on the marriage, and that Archduke
Ernest had gone to speak with him in order to force a resolution 116. The papal
nuntio, Filippo Sega, communicated the failure of Ernest’s endeavours to the
pope while noting approvingly how, throughout the summer of 1586, Ernest was
courting the electors to secure his nomination as King of the Romans. Archduke
Ferdinand had objected and demanded that Ernest stop these negotiations.
Ministers had started to take positions too. Rudolf II signalled his disapproval
by punishing two of them, but did nothing to his brothers. In June, Sega
reported that Rudolf II had decided not to marry and approved of Ernest
marrying Isabel, but had not made this public because he had not yet decided
whether Ernest should also become King of the Romans 117. By October rumour
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115   K. VOCELKA: Die Politische Propaganda..., op. cit., pp. 307-310; R. DISTELBERGER:
“Die Kunstkammerstücke”, in Prag um 1600, op. cit., I, pp. 449-450; also p. 441. R. J. W.
EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., pp. 79-80; p. 14 historiography.
116   Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the reign of Elizabeth, vol. XX: September
1585-May 1586, ed. S. Crawford Lomas, London 1921, p. 490, 4 April 1586; p. 570, News
from Prague 9 April 1586; p. 622, Prague 22 April.
117   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, op. cit.,
n. 122 p. 260, Sega to Azzolino, Prague, 24 June 1586 where he also commented that Ernest
“si vede prudente et benissimo disposto alla conservatione della religione cattolica”; n. 130, pp.
290-291, 29 July: 
“da questo punto del re de Romani pendesse, secondo ch’io intendo, la risolutione che
l’imperatore si contentasse, che Ernesto si casasse con l’infanta di Spagna, non mostrando
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had it that the election had been hindered by strong opposition against giving
the title to Ernest since he was poor and had no state. Consequently, Rudolf II
was considering ceding the Kingdom of Hungary to him. Sega also reported
that the emperor had decided that if the Protestants continued to oppose
Ernest’s election, he would resign his imperial title to Ernest, keeping only the
kingdom of Bohemia. Either way, Ernest was to marry Isabel. Philip II was said
to have approved these plans. Sega reported as if it were perfectly natural that
Rudolf II considered himself unfit to rule and to marry as a result of his “ill
health”. He added that Rudolf lacked the character and the desire to govern
effectively, as he was unable to endure the constant pressure of business 118.
Yet Rudolf II continued to endure the sustained pressure from his family and
the papacy to make a decision on the succession and the marriage 119. If we
accept Rudolf ’s own statement that he did not wish to marry, it is not difficult
to explain his predicament. If Ernest married Isabel, as so many people wanted,
the archduke would be in a powerful position to demand the succession. If he
had the succession, he was the obvious bridegroom for Isabel. Either way,
Rudolf II would face a powerful rival. Besides blocking his way in this, the
emperor did all he could to prevent Ernest getting more powerful. When
another chance to win the Polish crown arose in 1586 a number of Polish nobles
again supported his election to the crown, and he was supported also by Philip
II, the pope and the empress Maria. The pope showed his favour by sending him
a blessed sword. Rudolf II resented this and Ernest knew it. Somewhat
disingenuously he wrote: “I cannot think what my brother or the world are
afraid of ”. Rudolf II’s strategy shows cunning: he insisted that all the archdukes
be presented as candidates for the throne and refused to declare for any of them.
Seizing the opportunity, Archduke Maximilian set out to win over as many Poles
and Germans as he could and was rumoured to have Rudolf II’s support 120. The
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S. Maestà molta inclinatione di sottoporsi al gioco del matrimonio, resta dalla prima
confusione questo punto parimenti in sospeso” (p. 291).
118   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, op. cit.,
n. 146, pp. 327-329, Sega to Azzolino, Prague, 14 October 1586.
119   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, op. cit.,
n. 169, p. 398
120   Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia... Guillén de San Clemente, op. cit., pp. 74-
76, Vienna, 7 April 1587: “no sé yo lo q.e my hermano ni el mundo podrían temer, aunque entendiese 
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emperor played a key role in securing Ernest’s withdrawal of his candidacy in
favour of Maximilian subsequently 121, forcing Philip II to back Maximilian as
well 122. 
Ernest suffered further disappointment when Rudolf II blocked his
acquisition of the strategic Italian states of Modena and Regio. The
opportunity came about when the childless duke of Ferrara decided to cede
these lands to his cousin, Cesare d’Este. Sovereignty over these territories was
disputed between the papacy and the emperor. Knowing that the pope would
seize these lands if he could, Ferrara appealed to Rudolf II to endorse his
concession. Without military forces, the emperor asked for Philip II’s support,
but he argued that Rudolf II that he should cede these lands to one of his poor but
worthy brothers 123. Early in 1588 Ernest asked Philip II to help him get the two
duchies and the king readily agreed. Rudolf II now resorted to delay and
obfuscation 124. As Ernest realised, without his brother’s favour, his chances
were slight 125. When Rudolf II finally made a decision in favour of the duke in
1590 he tried to keep it secret from Ernest, who guessed that he was being kept
in the dark because it had gone against him. He was eventually informed by an
imperial official who tried to cause mischief by giving him the false information
that Philip II had put pressure on Rudolf II to favour the duke of Ferrara 126.
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q.e se inclina Su Santidad más á my q.e á otro”; n. LIII, p. 84 (7 June) Rudolf ’s decision “q.e
se propongan todos”. Sega reported this to Montalto on 10 March – Nuntiaturberichte aus
Deutschland... Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, op. cit., n. 171, p. 407. Maximilian’s
energetic efforts and Rudolf ’s support, n. 169, p. 397 and p. 399, Sega to Montalto, Prague
24 February.
121   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega, op. cit.,
n. 170, pp. 403-406, Sega to Montalto, Prague, 3 March 1587.
122   Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia... Guillén de San Clemente, op. cit., pp. 84-
85, pp. 90-92, pp. 95-98, p. 103.
123   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 362.
124   Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia... Guillén de San Clemente, op. cit., LXI,
pp. 107-108, 7 January 1588; Philip’s positive response; n. LXII, pp. 112-113, 8 February;
Rudolf ’s response, LXV, pp. 120-121, 5 June.
125   Ibidem, n. LXX, p. 130, 31 December 1588.
126   Ibidem, n. LXXXIII, pp. 169-170; LXXXV, p. 175, 25 December 1590.
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Such a blatant attempt to divide Ernest and Philip II demonstrates the unease
felt in the imperial court at their cooperation. 
While Ernest had little option other than to wait on his brother, Philip II
had sufficient power to end the long saga of his daughter’s marriage, so the
question arises why he did not. It is true that until Rudolf II withdrew officially
from the match, Isabel was considered to be engaged to him and Philip II
wanted to avoid direct conflict with the emperor. Ultimately, however, his
daughter’s interests and securing the succession to the Spanish Monarchy and
the Holy Roman Empire were more important. The speed with which the
Catalina and Carlo Emanuele produced their numerous progeny, while
delighting him on one level 127, had focused attention on the succession. Unless
Isabel married a Habsburg, if Prince Philip died the Spanish Monarchy would
fall to the house of Savoy. However, circumstances favoured delay. For much of
the period 1586-1589 Philip II’s energies were focused on the preparation of a
campaign against England. If the invasion was successful, Elizabeth I would be
deposed. Philip II believed he had the strongest dynastic rights, but as early as
1586 had declared he would transfer his rights to Isabel, who had strong claims
of her own to the English throne. Her chances could be enhanced or weakened
by the choice of husband for her. Rudolf II was not the best candidate, since his
extensive empire required his presence and he would be an absent monarch.
One of the archdukes would be better, but there was some wisdom in leaving
her unmarried and keeping open the prospect of an English candidate 128.
Under the circumstances, continuing the unresolved negotiations at a low level
was not unwelcome, and as they were handled by the empress, it created a
certain distance which protected the king’s honour. Occasionally, as in July
1588, Rudolf II would make a statement that suggested he would soon come to
a resolution. In this instance he commented that had no desire to take on
further burdens 129. 
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127   L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, p. 1142, mentions his
delight at being a grandfather.
128   M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: “The Anglo-Spanish war: the final episode in the ‘Wars
of the Roses’?”, in M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO & S. ADAMS (eds): England, Spain and the
Gran Armada, 1585-1604, Edinburgh 1991, pp. 1-44.
129   “also geschaffen ..., daß ich khainen lust gehabt, mir mehrern last auf den halß zu laden”,
cit. K. VOCELKA: Die Politische Propaganda..., op. cit., p. 175.
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It is no coincidence that Ernest was charged to raise the marriage and the
succession with Rudolf II after the invasion of England had failed. Once again,
Rudolf refused to give an answer 130. Ernest wrote despairingly to Philip II’s
ambassador that he saw no prospect of a resolution as Rudolf would not touch
these matters 131. In May 1589 the emperor’s confessor intervened again, begging
Ernest to make another effort. Although he agreed, Ernest was resigned to
failure. The death of Archduke Charles some months later depressed him further
as he thought Charles was the only one who might have persuaded Rudolf to
appoint a successor at least 132. Khevenhüller’s efforts were equally fruitless. In
vain he argued that Isabel’s future husband stood to gain enormous power: the
Low Countries as dowry and a good chance of taking “the whole Spanish
Monarchy if Prince Philip, who is a very sickly child, should die”. He stressed
that Philip II wanted Isabel’s children to inherit. In August 1589 Rudolf II again
made a move: he requested a further four-months to decide on the marriage. At
the same time he declared that he could not marry a woman he had never seen.
He was reminded that this was the way every other prince arranged their
marriage and besides, he had known Isabel as a child 133. A succession of portraits,
descriptions and reassurances followed which impressed him sufficiently to
declare that he considered Isabel to be without equal in terms of wealth, virtues,
blood, personal qualities and good looks 134. Still, the period of grace expired
without the hoped-for declaration. 
The anxiety felt in Rome, never mind Madrid or Prague, was acute. The
pope had written repeatedly urging Rudolf II both to marry and to arrange for
Ernest to be elected as King of the Romans as soon as possible. In September
1589 he again pressed for Ernest’s election 135. From Prague, the papal envoy
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130   Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia... Guillén de San Clemente, op. cit., n.
LXIX, pp. 128-129, from Ernest, 8 November 1588.
131   Ibidem, n. LXX, p. 131, New Year’s Eve, 1588: “Terrible cosa es q.e en el otro negocio
no siga resolución: ni aun principio ueo para comenzar á tratar dél”.
132   Ibidem, LXXV, p. 147-148, 13 May 1589. Ernest commented at the start of 1590
(p. 164) that Charles was most likely to get a solution “en el negocio de la sucesión”.
133   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 376-377.
134   Ibidem, p. 329.
135   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland, 1589-1592. Zweite Abteilung Die Nuntiatur am
Kaiserhofe. Dritter Band. Die Nuntien in Prag. Alfonso Visconte 1589-1591 & Camillo Caetano,
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reported that Rudolf II was still considering ceding Bohemia and Hungary to
Ernest to facilitate his candidature. His correspondence confirms that Ernest
was now considered there to be the prime candidate for Isabel’s hand 136. Not
surprisingly, Ernest demanded again to see Rudolf in person so as to get a
resolution on both these matters. Permission was only reluctantly conceded,
but his visit, which lasted from 19 February to 3 April 1590, resulted in empty
promises of a prompt resolution in the future. When the emperor sent an
urgent courier shortly after to Spain, hopes were raised that he had finally made
up his mind, but it was merely another request for more time to think. The
empress was so distressed that she fell ill. It was said that she alone now was
committed to Rudolf II’s marriage with Isabel 137. 
THE STAR-CROSSED BRIDE, 1590-1598
It is pertinent to ask whether the emperor’s behaviour might be due in some
measure to an increase of tensions along the fracture lines we noted earlier. The
answer is negative. Both monarchs were at peace with the Turks and while there
were periodic scares neither side had confronted the other with serious
demands for aid. Only in 1593 would the issue arise in this acute form. As for
religion, Rudolf II’s policies might well add up to little more than “spasms of
orthodox zeal”, as Evans puts it, but they were still in line with Catholic world,
and in 1597 he even withdrew some of his father’s concessions to the
Protestants in the Habsburg heartland. Even later, when he demonstrated
greater partiality for Protestants his court contained militant Catholics 138. In
one respect at least, there was less tension on Philip II’s part since his
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1591-1592, ed. J. Schweizer, Paderborn 1919, n. 34, p. 55, Montalto to Visconte, Rome, 16
September 1589. K. VOCELKA: Die Politische Propaganda..., op. cit., pp. 179-189.
136   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Alfonso Visconte & Camillo Caetano, op. cit., n.
63, p. 131, Visconte to Montalto, Prague, 26 December 1589.
137   Ibidem, the visit p. 143; the rumours, n. 83, p. 162, Visconte to Montalbo, 3 April
1590; María’s position, p. 55, note 3.
138   R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 35; chapter on the emperor’s
faith, pp. 84-115; advisers at court pp. 65-72; L. PEARSALL SMITH: The life and letters of Sir
Henry Wotton, 2 vols, Oxford 1907, I, n. 40, pp. 304-305, to Lord Zouche, 30 October 1597.
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dependence on German soldiers was not as great. The Austrian lands and
the Holy Roman Empire were crucial recruiting grounds and important for the
passage of troops. Using Parker’s figures, it appears that German troops made
up some 40% of the total forces of the Army of Flanders 139. Quite acute
conflicts with archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol after 1567 when he set out to
monopolise and control the king’s military operations in the region –as Philip II
put it, “what he wanted was, in effect, to tie my hands”– had made him redouble
his efforts to find alternative sources of supply and passage. The result was
closer ties with several German princes, both Catholic and Protestant 140. Then,
in 1587 his assiduous courting of Swiss Catholic cantons resulted in a formal
alliance 141. Philip II got his revenge later, rejecting Ferdinand’s daughters in
favour of those of Archduke Charles when selecting a bride for Prince Philip 142.
Nevertheless, he continued to levy German troops and the emperor was no
more reconciled to this practice now than he had been earlier. 
Italy continued to be a source of tension, with periodic crises which caused
intense exchanges, but no crisis arose to match earlier conflicts. Similarly, while
they frequently disagreed on policy towards the Low Countries, Philip II more
than once welcomed the prospect of the emperor’s mediation. In 1590 when
Rudolf II argued that he alone had sufficient authority to bring peace and
stability to the region and that only if he intervened personally and guaranteed
the peace would it hold, Philip II thanked him and asked for details of how he
thought this could be achieved 143. The initiative ended badly for Rudolf II.
The rebels refused to admit the imperial embassy. It was a sign of their
confidence and independence and a grave dishonour for the emperor 144.
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143   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 380-381.
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II.1 Rguez Salgado_Maquetación 1  25/04/11  16:04  Página 376
In 1590 the situation changed dramatically. The crisis started on 1 August 1589
when the last Valois king of France died, naming the Protestant Henry IV as his
successor. France was plunged into another, devastating civil war. Early in the new
year, Philip II reluctantly accepted he would need to intervene on behalf of the
Catholic League and delay his planned invasion of England. It meant diverting
resources from the Low Countries as well. As in the case of England, he decided
not to pursue his own dynastic claims, but was determined from the outset to press
the strong claims of the Infanta Isabel, both to the duchy of Brittany where there
was no salic law, and to the French crown, if that law was rescinded. This attempt
to place Isabel on the French throne split the Catholic world. Many Catholics,
including the pope, did not want to give the Spanish Habsburgs further power.
But Philip II was adamant that his daughter’s rights must be upheld 145. One
again, her marriage became a contested issue. Her chances of gaining the crown
could be enhanced by a match with a French Catholic, especially those who like
the son of the duke of Lorraine or the duke of Guise, had some claims of their
own. The problem was that their status was greatly inferior to hers and that it still
exposed the Spanish Monarchy to being taken over by a foreign dynasty.
According to Khevenhüller the prospect of her marriage to a Frenchman goaded
Rudolf into action. He requested another year to decide if he wanted to marry
Isabel. Maria and Khevenhüller were now in a panic; convinced that they would
lose her unless Rudolf II withdrew and supported Ernest’s suit for the match and
the imperial succession. The sense of crisis was such that Rudolf II ordered
Khevenhüller to go to Prague immediately for talks, promising it would result in
a final decision. Some claimed that it was the Spanish monarch, others that it was
Maria, who sent him on this mission 146. Since it was widely known that Philip II
now preferred Ernest to marry his daughter, rumours spread that he did not take
this round of negotiations with Rudolf II seriously 147.
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145   M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: “Philip II and the post-Armada crisis: foreign policy and
rebellion, 1588-1594”, in Después de la Gran Armada: La Historia Desconocida (1588-16..),
Cuadernos Monográficos del Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval. Suplemento al nº 20, Madrid
1993, esp. pp. 79-81, 83, 86-88; D. L. JENSEN: Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernardino de
Mendoza and the French Catholic League, Cambridge (Mass.) 1964, pp. 193-196.
146   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 386-387, pp. 402-404.
147   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Alfonso Visconte & Camillo Caetano, op. cit.,
n. 63, p. 131, Visconte to Montalto, Prague, 26 December 1589 noted the belief that Philip II
preferred Ernest; n. 192, p. 381, Caetano to Sfondrato, Prague, 27 August 1591 on Khevenhüller’s
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The question is, was Rudolf II serious? When informed of Khevenhüller’s
mission Ernest hoped that it would bring about a resolution, but was inclined
to believe that nothing short of a miracle would prompt a decision from his
brother 148. He was becoming bitter and disillusioned 149. Seen from Rudolf ’s
perspective, the dangers of any decision were apparent. Isabel was undoubtedly
a great prize: her dowry fixed as Low Countries, and if Prince Philip died as
so many said he would, the Spanish Monarchy. She might also get Brittany
and even the French throne. All this could be united with the imperial title and
authority, the Austrian provinces, Bohemia and Hungary. The power Rudolf II
might exercise in future must have been tempting. But Christendom would
surely not allow the creation of this universal Habsburg monarchy. Would it not
condemn him to endless conflict? Quite apart from his own disinclination to
marry, this was a powerful disincentive. But Rudolf II was aware that Ernest
was the favoured candidate for Isabel’s hand. The matter was openly discussed
in France and elsewhere, and he remained the natural candidate for the title of
King of the Romans. If he allowed that marriage to go ahead his younger
brother would be almost as powerful, and potentially far more powerful, than
he was. Of course, he could try to block this by electing one of the other
archdukes, but this too had its dangers. It could make an enemy of Ernest and
of Philip II. Rudolf II’s way to deal with these tough choices was to stall on all
fronts 150. Maria eventually appreciated that they had blundered by linking the
marriage and the succession and tried to disentangle them. She urged Rudolf
II to get Ernest elected as King of the Romans immediately, suggesting he
could be forbidden from marrying thus guaranteeing the succession to the
imperial title for Rudolf II’s sons 151. It made no difference.
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mission; n. 200, p. 396, Giovanni Dolfin to the Doge of Venice, Prague, 1 October 1591 also
on this and the rumours it provoked. 
148   Marqués de AYERBE (ed.): Correspondencia... Guillén de San Clemente, op. cit., n. XC,
p. 188, 16 September 1591: “sin duda no podrá dexar de resultar della resolución en muchas
cosas”; n. XCI, p. 192: “Si la uenida de Keuenhuiller no haze milagros, no sé q.e esperar”.
149   Ibidem, Ernest’s state of mind in late 1590 and in 1591: ns. LXXXV, LXXVII,
LXXXVIII, pp. 174-184.
150   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 404 (1591); p. 415 the dream/nightmare
scenario.
151   Ibidem, pp. 316-317. 
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An attempt on the emperor’s life early in 1591 raised new fears that the
Habsburgs would lose the imperial title 152. The lack of firm government and
uncertainty about the future combined to undermine obedience and respect.
The English noble, Sir Henry Wotton, remarked on the fact that Rudolf II was
deliberately keeping his brothers short of money – another tactic he used to
contain them. Instead of enhancing his authority, however, he “rather now
seems to bear the title of Emperor for fashion sake, than authority to command
by virtue of it”. Hardly anyone besides the Bohemians was providing funds.
Wotton concluded that unless he made a bid for Protestant support by allowing
religious freedom, he would lose the empire 153. In a similar vein, the Venetian
ambassador Contarini commented in 1596 that Rudolf II had “dignità e non
autorità”. The imperial princes and the estates of his own lands enjoyed great
autonomy and did not provide sufficient money to allow him to play the leading
role in Christendom that he wanted or felt he deserved 154. Observers could not
agree, however, on why Rudolf II was such a failure. Some –including
Contarini– resorted to the old and convenient stereotype: it was his Spanish
habits which made him unpopular with Germans. Wottom was more reflective,
but could not decide whether it was due to his great ambition or his prodigality;
his decision to enforce religious orthodoxy, “or lastly, lust and pleasure”.
Whatever the cause, Rudolf II had brought about the decay of “almost the
noblest house of Christendom” 155. 
During the long gap between the announcement that Khevenhüller would go
to Prague and his arrival there, a veritable flood of rumours surfaced. The papal
nuncio thought that archduke Maximilian was now the one “for whom they
would secure the title of King of the Romans” and Isabel – perhaps this was a
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152   L. PEARSALL SMITH: The life and letters of Sir Henry Wotton, op. cit., I, p. 251, to
Zouche,Vienna, 9 January 1591. 
153   L. PEARSALL SMITH: The life and letters of Sir Henry Wotton, op. cit., I, p. 267, to
Zouche,Vienna, 17 April 1591on the annuities, cit. p. 268.
154   R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., pp. 77-80. He comments on p. 52
that one of the most distinguishing aspects of Rudolf ’s character was his desire for political
activity and “the striving for an international role which proved hopelessly unrealizable”.
155   L. PEARSALL SMITH: The life and letters of Sir Henry Wotton, op. cit., I, pp. 268-269,
to Zouche, 17 April 1591. Contarini’s Relazione of 1596 cit. H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario...,
op. cit., p. 29, note 104: “Il presente Imperatore non ha l’Imperio favorevole per grazia, perché
per i costumi spagnoli non è punto amato”.
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slip on his part rather than a new policy. It was generally believed that Philip II
could not longer bear to part with his daughter, who had become his closest
companion, so the archduke would go to Spain for the marriage and remain
there 156. Philip II still avoided committing himself openly. He asked the French
Catholics to accept Isabel and “one of the Archdukes” as their sovereigns. But
Ernest’s name was frequently mentioned 157. By contrast, imperial officials
insisted that Rudolf II would marry Isabel. One minister told the Venetian
ambassador towards the end of January 1591 that the match was almost finalised
and an announcement imminent 158. The same message was put about The
Hague a year later by Otto Heinrich von den Bilandt, a member of the imperial
peace mission to the Low Countries. The match was an essential part of the
negotiating stance of this commission. They argued that as the Low Countries
would be ceded to Rudolf II as Isabel’s dowry, the rebels could surrender to the
emperor rather than to Philip II, and peace would be restored 159. Bilandt, who
was a Protestant, later informed Thomas Bodley, the English representative in
The Hague, that Philip II did not want Isabel to marry Rudolf II because the two
sovereigns were in constant conflict – there were “many crossings and secret
dislikes” between them. The marriage proposal was “not seriously intended” by
Spain, but Rudolf II was so keen that he had undertaken this peace mission “out
of hope of having the King’s daughter with the Low Countries as her dowry” 160.
There was widespread fear that Rudolf II would unite the two Habsburg
empires and become “a great enough monarch to command the rest” 161.
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156   Pietro Millino to Bertinoro, secretary of Clement VIII, 10 January 1592, cit. J. I.
TELLECHEA IDÍGORAS: El ocaso de un rey. Felipe II visto desde la nunciatura de Madrid 1594-
1598, Madrid 2001, p. 15.
157   List and analysis of State Papers... Elizabeth I, op. cit., III, pp. 302-303, based on Sir
Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, Noyon, 15 October 1591; pp. 390-393 dispatches from
debates of the spring of 1592.
158   Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland... Alfonso Visconte & Camillo Caetano, op. cit., n.
220, p. 441, Dolfin to the Doge, Prague, 21 January 1592. 
159   List and analysis of State Papers... Elizabeth I, op. cit., III, ns. 222-223, pp. 181-182,
T. Bodley’s dispatches to Burghley, 2 February 1592. 
160   Ibidem, III, p. 183, Bodley to Burghley, 15 March 1592.
161   Ibidem, III, reports of N. L. De Mouy to Burghley, from Aachen, March 1592, p.
472 and p. 475 where the quote is taken.
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Interestingly, there were rumours by March 1592 that Isabel was not eager to
marry Rudolf II because she believed he had syphilis 162. For a time it was
widely rumoured she would marry Henry IV – unlikely as it would seem that
Philip II would give his daughter to a married, Protestant man he considered a
heretic and usurper. Elizabeth I was sufficiently alarmed by the news she
demanded to know the truth. Henry IV confirmed in April 1592 that he had
been offered Isabel’s hand on condition he returned to the Catholic fold, and
that he had rejected it because he would never forsake his religion. Later he
assured her he could not accept the Infanta because his affections were already
engaged to the English Queen. This touch of gallantry brings the rumours
down to earth and confirms that he was using them to frighten Elizabeth I into
giving him more aid to continue the war 163. Some argued that Philip II would
only allow Isabel to marry an archduke “for fear of the death of his son”. Others
reckoned that what concerned him was to ensure that Isabel’s husband was not
powerful enough to “seek to displace his weak son of his succession to his
crown”; consequently he no longer wanted Rudolf II. Rumours also spread in
France that Philip II preferred a match between Isabel and Archduke Albert,
who had not yet taken holy orders 164. 
When he finally reached Prague, Khevenhüller found the emperor more
irresolute than ever, 
contradicting himself and full of doubts; he could not decide whether to accept
the marriage, nor would he say that he preferred to be replaced by one of is
brothers. 
In vain he reminded Rudolf of the many lands Isabel would bring and that she
was, in every sense, a desirable woman. Against all expectation, Rudolf II
ordered the ambassador to return to Spain with nothing more than his word
that he would declare his decision in future. Under instructions from Maria
and Philip II, Khevenhüller consulted in secret both the marriage and the
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162   List and analysis of State Papers... Elizabeth I, op. cit., III, p. 393, from Sir Henry
Unton to Burghley, Diepper, 19 March 1592, ibid, 20 March, repeated and expanded, p.
472.
163   Ibidem, III, p. 369, January 1592 and p. 380, which also contains Henry’s answer of
1 April and p. 383 his comments of 8 April to Wilkes.
164   Ibidem, III, p. 388 and quotes in 393 from Unton’s reports 19 March 1592 and 23
March respectively and further quotes p. 472.
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succession with archdukes Ernest, Charles and Maximilian 165. The failure of
this mission and the need to make a declaration with regards to Isabel’s
marriage persuaded Philip II to act unilaterally. He decided that Isabel would
marry Ernest, on whom he bestowed the government of the Low Countries.
Rudolf II was outraged at this decision. He complained formally and
vociferously both about the appointment and the match. He argued that Philip
II did not have the authority to command or appoint the archdukes without
permission from Rudolf II, who was their overlord, nor did Ernest have the
right to accept such service or marry without assent from his sovereign. Philip
II replied curtly that it was entirely Rudolf ’s fault. Isabel and the Low
Countries had been destined for him and he had chosen to reject them 166. It is
worth noting that at the time these exchanges occurred, Philip II drew up
another will 167. He sensed his life ebbing away and was determined to provide
for his daughter.
Rudolf II would not let the matter drop. He did all in his power to hinder
the marriage 168. He also tried to persuade Ernest that he was making a serious
mistake. If he became governor in the Low Countries on Philip II’s behalf he
would seriously damage his chances of becoming the next Holy Roman
Emperor. Marrying Isabel would definitely put him out of contention. He
would be compromised by this association with the Catholic camp and
closeness to a hated, foreign prince. Perhaps similar arguments had dissuaded
Rudolf from the match in the past. According to Cabrera de Córdoba, he also
told Ernest that as he could not have children, the succession was guaranteed
for him. The arguments were cogent enough to make Ernest hesitate.
Ultimately, however, the prospect of a royal marriage, the Low Countries, and
possibly the French throne and that of England, not to mention the Spanish
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165   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 415-477, cit. pp. 415-416: “el emperador...
contradiziéndose entre sí mesmo, lleno de dudas, nunca se acauaua de resoluer a açeptar aquel
matrimonio, ni declaraua que gustaua que sucediesse en él alguno de sus hermanos”. He was also
charged to explore a marriage for Prince Philip. L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe
II..., op. cit., III, pp. 1463-1464.
166   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 418-419.
167   It was sealed on 7 March 1594, Tellechea: Nunciatura, n. 6 & 7, pp. 124-125, Camillo
Caetani to Pietro Aldobrandini, 10 March 1594, and Avvisi (Newsletter) 26 March.
168   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 432.
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Monarchy, were too tempting to reject. He took the first step towards a brilliant
future by assuming the governorship of the Low Countries 169. 
Matters had reached crisis point at a bad time for Rudolf II. When the Turks
declared war in 1593 he turned to Philip II for aid. His requests did not find
favour: “Not a word nor anything else should be given” was Philip II’s reaction.
True, he was then at war in France and against England and the Low Countries,
but after the way Rudolf II had behaved, there was no sympathy for him in the
Spanish court. Only sustained pressure from the papacy prompted Philip II to
send 300,000 ducats in 1594 and another 300,000 the following year, with
100,000 escudos to the prince of Transilvania 170. Some commentators noted
sharply that this support should have come automatically given the king’s duty
to his house and his kin as well as to Christendom 171. By the same token,
Rudolf II should have helped Philip II in France, as he had been urged to do by
the other Catholic powers since 1589, and in the Low Countries, and he had
done neither. In April 1596 Philip II informed the papal nuncio that he was
willing to support papal initiatives against the Turks in the Mediterranean but
given the wars he was engaged in, he could do nothing more for Hungary.
Similar arguments were used to counter the nuncio’s spirited demands for aid
the following year 172.
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169   L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, p. 1463: 
“Juzgaba se metía con esto en las cosas del Rey su tío, tanto aborrecidas sumamente
de los príncipes sectarios, que le obstaría mucho para ser creado César, pues su hermano no
tenía hijos ni esperança y facultad para tenerlos, por no estar casado y no darle habilidad
sus enfermedades. Dubdó mucho [Ernesto] en aceptar el gobierno de Flandes, mas
conociendo su importancia y cercanía para estar pronto a entrar en Francia, si era electo
rey, como se trataba, con la Infanta su prima...”
170   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 445 and p. 455; J. I. TELLECHEA IDÍGORAS:
El ocaso de un rey..., op. cit., n. 17, p. 131, Caetani to Aldobrandini, 13 June 1594; n. 34, p.
142, 20 October; n. 40, p. 147, 13 December; n. 41, p. 148, 23 December.
171   R. GONZÁLEZ CUERVA: “Cruzada y dinastía: Las mujeres de la Casa de Austria ante
la larga guerra de Hungría”, in J. MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN & Mª. P. MARÇAL LOURENÇO (eds.):
Las Relaciones Discretas..., op. cit., II, pp. 1149-1186, esp. pp. 1150-1154; he quotes on p.
1153, n. 14, Philip II’s holograph comment, 20 November 1593, from AGS, Estado, 2855,
s.n.: “En lo del ayudar a lo del turco no se den palabras ni cosa”.
172   J. I. TELLECHEA IDÍGORAS: El ocaso de un rey..., op. cit., n. 71, p. 165, Caetano to
Aldobrandini, 30 April 1596; n. 121, p. 218, 18 July 1597.
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By then he was involved in another, unpleasant row with Rudolf II. Ernest’s
success, so long awaited, was limited and short-lived. The majority of French
Catholics rejected his joint candidature for the throne in the spring of 1593 173.
Although Philip II continued to demand recognition of Isabel’s rights to
Brittany and France, by 1595 it was clear that the cause was hopeless and that a
general peace was the best way to settle affairs. When Ernest arrived in the Low
Countries he was charged with exploring peace. The process had hardly started
when death overcame him in February 1595 174. Once again, the Infanta Isabel
had lost a potential husband. 
A MARRIAGE CONCLUDED AND A GREAT SECRET UNVEILED
News of this disaster arrived at a court that was already seriously unsettled
by Philip II’s seriously illness, which lasted from April to July 1595. In fact, it
may well have made him worse. Yet it also prompted him to act with great
alacrity in order to provide for his unfortunate daughter. Without hesitation, he
made arrangements for the archduke Albert to succeed both as governor of the
Low Countries and as her future husband. Albert had recently become
Archbishop of Toledo and was within an ace of taking his final vows when he
was sent to the Low Countries 175.
As early as 1576 Philip II had described Albert with evident fondness as
“the best” of Maria’s many sons. Since 1570 he had educated and nurtured him
and Albert responded with loyalty and affection. He had proved an effective
viceroy of Portugal, and in 1590 the king had already considered sending him
to the Low Countries. When he felt too ill and old to govern alone, he called
Albert to serve as his aide. When the archduke arrived at court, the king
manifest great love and respect for him in public, placing him between himself
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173   L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, pp. 1465, 1471-1475.
174   M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO: “«Ni cerrando ni abriendo la puerta». Las
negociaciones de paz entre Felipe II e Isabel I, 1594-1598”, in: A. MARCOS MARTÍN (ed.):
Libro Homenaje para el Director José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, Valladolid 2010 (en prensa).
175   J. I. TELLECHEA IDÍGORAS: El ocaso de un rey..., op. cit., pp. 154-157, the king’s health;
p. 157, 15 July 1595, confirming he was preparing Albert’s departure; M. J. RODRÍGUEZ
SALGADO: “«Ni cerrando ni abriendo la puerta». Las negociaciones de paz...”, op. cit.
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and prince Philip, who was clearly discomforted when forced to walk on the left
hand of the cardinal-archduke rather than at his father’s right-hand. It was a
real as well as a symbolic move. Philip II’s absolute trust and reliance on Albert
led him to delegate much business to his nephew and he could be forgiven if he
thought that providence had ordained he should end up in a position to marry
Isabel just before taking his final vows. Sweeping aside opposition from his
ministers both to Albert’s governorship and to the separation of the Low
Countries from the Spanish Monarchy, Philip II pressed ahead with all haste
for the marriage and the partition of the empire. The pope was asked to accept
his reversion to secular status and to permit the marriage of the two cousins 176. 
Philip II had not consulted Rudolf II on any of this. Cabrera de Córdoba
asserts that it was not until all the pre-requisites for the marriage were complete
that he decided to inform the emperor. It was carefully coordinate. He
informed Albert that they would both inform the pope and Rudolf at the same
time. He specified that Albert should give Rudolf the news “without going into
details, try to get his approval”. At the same time they would both demand that
Albert be elected as King of the Romans. The pope was asked to support both
initiatives 177. This account differs from that of Khevenhüller in one important
respect: the ambassador claims that Philip II sought the emperor’s agreement
for the match but tried to “dispel the suspicions he had conceived that as a
result of this marriage the succession to the Holy Roman Empire would fall to
Albert”. Indeed, he “had never even imagined this, nor did he ever aim for
this”. This apparently “reassured the emperor somewhat” 178. But if this were
385
I love him as a father loves a son...
176   L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, p. 1490: “prometo a
vuestra Alteza”, Philip had written to María in December of 1576, “que creo yo que Alberto
tiene más partes que ninguno”. Possible appointment to the Low Countries, p. 1249; called to
Madrid, p. 1347; pp. 1484-1485 details of his reception and his new role; opposition to his
appointment, p. 1642. Also H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 436-437. Albert’s
reception and actions in the Low Countries, pp. 447ff.; and M. J. RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO:
“«Ni cerrando ni abriendo la puerta». Las negociaciones de paz...”, op. cit. Ordination: J. I.
TELLECHEA IDÍGORAS: El ocaso de un rey..., op. cit., n. 39, p. 146, Caetani to Aldobrandini,
3 December 1594.
177   L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, p. 1635: “dándole parte
dello, sin entrar en particularidades, procure que lo apruebe... para atraer al Emperador a lo que
le han de pedir en lo del Rey de Romanos para vos...”, pp. 1635-1636 instructions for dealing
with Rome.
178   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., p. 469: 
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the case, one would expect Rudolf II to have been less extreme in his reaction
against the announcement. Khevenhüller claims that Rudolf II’s response to the
news was as before. He ordered his officials to do everything possible to prevent
the marriage. Furthermore, he now apparently accused Philip II of misconduct
in the marriage negotiations. He claimed that he had not been treated as other
suitors. He had never been offered the Low Countries as a dowry, nor had the
king responded to his request for Milan. By way of response, Philip II reminded
him that they had waited thirteen years for him to make up his mind, and that
Isabel was now 31 and it was imperative for her to marry at once. As for ceding
Milan, since Rudolf had never declared openly that this was a condition of the
marriage, he had not been obliged to address the issue. In his account, Cabrera
de Córdoba confirms that Rudolf refused to accept both Albert’s appointment
as governor of the Low Countries and as husband to Isabel, but claims that he
argued that Albert had more than enough power and status as Archbishop of
Toledo and that Isabel should be married to archduke Maximilian, who was poor
and had no title. If so, it was a rather belated recognition on Rudolf II’s part of
how little he had done for his siblings 179. 
Khevenhüller advised his master to dissimulate rather than exacerbate the
conflict, but Rudolf II would not relent. He was so angry that he decided to
have his revenge by offering marriage to Marie de’Medici, a niece of the
Grand-duke of Florence, with whom Philip II was then on bad terms. Had this
gone ahead, Isabel would have been dishonoured and the emperor could have
destabilised North Italy. But nothing came of it 180. To demonstrate his imperial
authority and meddle in his brother’s business, Rudolf II decided to intervene
in the Low Countries. Both Philip II and Albert were minded to negotiate peace
so they did not object openly, although they were wary of him. As before, the
rebels did not want peace, and sent an envoy to the imperial court requesting
that he should not interfere; leaving him in no doubt that if necessary they
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“que su mag[esta]d cesárea persiesse la sospecha que auía concebido que no por este
cassamiento se deriuaua en Alberto la successión en el Imperio, porque su magestad del rey
don Filipe no lo auía aun imaginado, ni aun tenía tal intento ni era deste parezer. Con
esta respuesta se sosegó algún tanto el emperador”.
179   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 468-469. Detail about Albert and
Maximilian in L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, p. 1636.
180   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 468-469. 
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would openly reject his authority 181. He suffered a further, significant setback
in that other disputed area, Italy. In May 1598 Philip II brought to an end the
long-running saga of Finale. Protracted and patient negotiations had persuaded
the elderly and childless marquis to sell it to him. Rudolf II refused to accept the
settlement. Edelmayer argues that this was because of the protests from other
competitors 182. This might well have made matters worse, but his hostility was
surely another manifestation of his desire to impose his superior, imperial
authority in the region, and to prevent the Spanish branch from expanding at
the expense of imperial fiefs. 
Such clashes caused resentment which was sometimes expressed in terms of
antipathy towards “Spain”. But there is nothing to suggest that Rudolf II’s
rejection of Isabel was determined by xenophobic sentiments. In 1612
Melchior Godast characterised Rudolf ’s attitude towards his neighbours thus:
“the Spaniard he would never trust, the Pope he disagreed with, the French he
viewed with ill-humour...” 183. This balanced picture is far more convincing
than the anti-hispanism pervading some recent works on Rudolf. The
emperor’s suspicion and hostility were broadly aimed and not just targeted
against Spain. Even if he had acted differently, Philip II’s very power would
have been a challenge to the emperor. Moreover, Rudolf II had ample cause to
be aggrieved, as some shrewd observers noted. Having commented on the
extraordinary affection and favour Philip II had for Albert, Cabrera de Córdoba
offered an enigmatic and unexplained comment: “His Majesty had forgotten
the meaning of Tacitus” saying: “The great secret was now revealed that
emperors could be made outside Rome” 184. This allusion to the usurpation of
the imperial title by a ruler from Spain –Galba marched on Rome and took the
imperial crown– was apposite in more than one respect. Of course, Philip II was
only one of many who repeatedly pressed Rudolf to name a successor. But after
1585 he took a leading role in attempting to secure the title for the archduke that
was to marry his daughter. He was determined to “make the emperor”, paving
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181   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 464-465.
182   F. EDELMAYER: Maximilian II., Philipp II. und Reichsitalien, op. cit., pp. 216-217.
183   Cit. R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 5.
184   L. CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, p. 1490: “no se acordaba
su majestad de la interpretación del decir Tácito: "Se divulgó el gran secreto de que se podían
hacer los emperadores fuera de Roma”. “It is taken from the beginning of Tacitus” Histories.
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the way for imperial honour and power to fall on Isabel’s sons. It is not too far-
fetched to speculate that from Rudolf ’s point of view he had crossed the sacred
line; he was attempting to usurp a function that appertained exclusively to
Rudolf II and the electors. The matter was made graver by the extreme aversion
he manifested from the outset to the designation of a successor. Even after 1598
Rudolf II continued to resist this on the grounds that it would diminish his
authority 185. 
The long and cruel game of retaining the option to marry Isabel Clara
Eugenia and thus prevent her from marrying anyone can be seen as his revenge
and linked with Rudolf II’s obsessive concern for supreme authority. Patriarchs
had power to determine the marriage strategy of the dynasty. For more than
thirteen years, he held Philip II and Isabel in thrall, exercising the ultimate
power over members of the House. In similar fashion, he hindered the marriage
of his siblings. At best, this worked well in the short term, allowing Rudolf II
to manifest his power. Ultimately, however, this policy and his obdurate refusal to
appoint a successor, had disastrous results for him personally, for the dynasty,
for Bohemia and Hungary, and for the Holy Roman Empire, when archduke
Matthias finally broke ranks and led a rebellion to usurp his crowns. Moreover,
he lost the chance of re-unifying the Low Countries with the Holy Roman
Empire and so strengthening the Austrian branch. 
Philip II too had ample cause to be resentful of the way Rudolf II had acted,
with such utter disregard for the honour of Isabel and the future of the Spanish
Habsburg branch. He had expected that Rudolf would show gratitude and
affection and found only competition. Such was the nature of politics. He
refused to acknowledge inferiority and when it suited him, had no compunction
in offering Rudolf ’s fiancée to others. The Infanta Isabel was an innocent
victim of these power struggles, which blighted her life for many years. 
Even the final steps to her marriage were marked by high drama. The papal
dispensations were not issued until April 1597 and further adjustments had to
be made before the requisite ceremonies could be carried out and Albert was
free to marry 186. It was not until 8 May 1598, with Philip II to ill to leave his
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185   R. J. W. EVANS: Rudolf II and his world..., op. cit., p. 58: “kann man auch einen
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II.1 Rguez Salgado_Maquetación 1  25/04/11  16:04  Página 388
bed, and in the presence of the empress Maria, that a simple ceremony was held
in chamber to mark the signing of the marriage contract 187. Before it was final,
however, the marriage had to be carried out in person and consummated. Philip
II wanted to be present at the ceremony and ordered Albert to return to Spain,
but also charged him with escorting Prince Philip’s bride, Margaret of Austria,
to Spain. To his distress, the king died in September 1598 before Albert
returned. This gave those who opposed the marriage and the separation of the
Low Countries from the Spanish Monarchy a chance to argue for a revocation
of Philip II’s policies. To his credit, Philip III decided to honour his word 188.
While he would do all he could to curb Albert’s power, he arranged a
spectacular double wedding in 1599 which finally ended the long and agonising
saga of Isabel’s marriage.
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187   H. KHEVENHÜLLER: Diario..., op. cit., pp. 473-479; conditions in L. CABRERA DE
CÓRDOBA: Historia de Felipe II..., op. cit., III, pp. 1641-1643.
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